The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ambiguity and rationality
Abstract
Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction. We show how this definition can explain why ambiguity affects decisions in the ways it does. We argue that there are a variety of rational reasons ambiguity affects probability judgments and choices in the ways it does. However, we argue that the ambiguity effect does not cast doubt on the claim that utility theory is a standard of rational choice. Rather, we suggest that the effect of ambiguity on decisions highlights the fact that utility theory, like any normative model of decision making only prescribes the optimal decision, given what one knows.
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Cites
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence
Shafer, G. (2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv10vm1qb · Cited by 11,711
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence
Shafer, G. (1976) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691214696 · Cited by 9,083
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
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Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
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Judgment under uncertainty: List of contributors
Kahneman, D. J., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982) · Cited by 4,670
Judgment under uncertainty: Causality and attribution
Kahneman, D. J., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982) · Cited by 4,670
Decision analysis and behavioral research
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Cited by
The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation.
Loewenstein, G. (1994) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.75 · Cited by 2,738
Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122575 · Cited by 1,795
Organizational behavior and human decision processes
Armstrong, J. S. (1988) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(88)90125-2 · Cited by 1,753
Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty
Heath, C., & Tversky, A. (1991) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00057884 · Cited by 1,654
Behavioral Decision Research: A Constructive Processing Perspective
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1992) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.43.020192.000511 · Cited by 1,448
Metadata
- Authors
- Frisch, D., & Baron, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988-07
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 149-157
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W2083719855
- Cited by
- 451
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 9.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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