A re‐examination of probability matching and rational choice
Abstract
In a typical probability learning task participants are presented with a repeated choice between two response alternatives, one of which has a higher payoff probability than the other. Rational choice theory requires that participants should eventually allocate all their responses to the high‐payoff alternative, but previous research has found that people fail to maximize their payoffs. Instead, it is commonly observed that people match their response probabilities to the payoff probabilities. We report three experiments on this choice anomaly using a simple probability learning task in which participants were provided with (i) large financial incentives, (ii) meaningful and regular feedback, and (iii) extensive training. In each experiment large proportions of participants adopted the optimal response strategy and all three of the factors mentioned above contributed to this. The results are supportive of rational choice theory. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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In learning tasks, participants who initially match increasingly adopt maximizing as their strategy.
“In such tasks, participants who initially match increasingly adopt maximizing as their strategy (e.g.,Saldana et al., 2022;Shanks et al., 2002).”
From Probability matching and statistical naïveté (2025) · cites this paper as Shanks et al., 2002
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- Authors
- Shanks, D. R., Tunney, R. J., & McCarthy, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Shanks, David R.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-03-18
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 233-250
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W2069538478
- Cited by
- 322
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 3.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- University College London
- Economic and Social Research Council
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Keywords
- probability matching, rational choice, probability learning, response allocation, financial incentives, feedback, training, optimal strategies
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