Cited by 322Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies

A re‐examination of probability matching and rational choice

Shanks, David R., Tunney, Richard J., McCarthy, John D.·2002·Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Abstract

In a typical probability learning task participants are presented with a repeated choice between two response alternatives, one of which has a higher payoff probability than the other. Rational choice theory requires that participants should eventually allocate all their responses to the high‐payoff alternative, but previous research has found that people fail to maximize their payoffs. Instead, it is commonly observed that people match their response probabilities to the payoff probabilities. We report three experiments on this choice anomaly using a simple probability learning task in which participants were provided with (i) large financial incentives, (ii) meaningful and regular feedback, and (iii) extensive training. In each experiment large proportions of participants adopted the optimal response strategy and all three of the factors mentioned above contributed to this. The results are supportive of rational choice theory. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Crossref · 10.1002/bdm.413

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  • In learning tasks, participants who initially match increasingly adopt maximizing as their strategy.

    “In such tasks, participants who initially match increasingly adopt maximizing as their strategy (e.g.,Saldana et al., 2022;Shanks et al., 2002).”

    From Probability matching and statistical naïveté (2025) · cites this paper as Shanks et al., 2002

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Authors
Shanks, D. R., Tunney, R. J., & McCarthy, J. D.
Affiliations
University College London (GB)
Corresponding author
Shanks, David R.
Venue
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2002-03-18
Volume
15
Issue
3
Pages
233-250
ISSN
  • 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
  • 1099-0771
OpenAlex
W2069538478
Cited by
322
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 15
FWCI
3.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • University College London
  • Economic and Social Research Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
probability matching, rational choice, probability learning, response allocation, financial incentives, feedback, training, optimal strategies

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