Cited by 85Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Probability matching and strategy availability

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J. Koehler, Derek, James, Greta·2010·Memory & Cognition

Abstract

Findings from two experiments indicate that probability matching in sequential choice arises from an asymmetry in strategy availability: The matching strategy comes readily to mind, whereas a superior alternative strategy, maximizing, does not. First, compared with the minority who spontaneously engage in maximizing, the majority of participants endorse maximizing as superior to matching in a direct comparison when both strategies are described. Second, when the maximizing strategy is brought to their attention, more participants subsequently engage in maximizing. Third, matchers are more likely than maximizers to base decisions in other tasks on their initial intuitions, suggesting that they are more inclined to use a choice strategy that comes to mind quickly. These results indicate that a substantial subset of probability matchers are victims of "underthinking" rather than "overthinking": They fail to engage in sufficient deliberation to generate a superior alternative to the matching strategy that comes so readily to mind.

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  • As preregistered, probability matchers and maximizers have been categorized in prior work.

    “As preregistered, this is how probability matchers and maximizers have been categorized in prior work (e.g.,Koehler and James, 2010).”

    From Probability matching and statistical naïveté (2025) · cites this paper as Koehler and James, 2010

  • Koehler and James (2010) found significant correlations between the CRT and the use of and endorsement of maximizing strategies on probabilistic prediction tasks.

    “Finally, Koehler and James (2010) found significant correlations between the CRT and the use of and endorsement of maximizing strategies on probabilistic prediction tasks.”

    From The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011) · cites this paper as Koehler and James (2010)

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Authors
J. Koehler, D., & James, G.
Affiliations
University of Waterloo (CA)
Venue
Memory & Cognition
Published
2010-09
Volume
38
Issue
6
Pages
667-676
ISSN
  • 0090-502X (ISSN-L)
  • 1532-5946
OpenAlex
W1979776966
Cited by
85
References
18
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 4
FWCI
2.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Memory & Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
probability matching, maximization, sequential choice, overthinking, intuition, decision-making, strategy selection, deliberation
MeSH terms
Attention, Choice Behavior, Cues, Female, Humans, Individuality, Judgment, Male, Probability Learning, Problem Solving, Thinking, Intuition

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