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Cited by 599

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Who accepts Savage's axiom?

Slovic, Paul, Tversky, Amos·1974·Behavioral Science
DOI 10.1002/bs.3830190603
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Abstract

Many decision theorists believe that the axioms of rational choice are similar to the principles of logic in the sense that no reasonable person who understands them would wish to violate them. The present study questions this view by investigating the acceptability of a key axiom underlying expected utility theory—Savage's independence principle. Persistent violations of this axiom were observed, even after it was presented to subjects in a clear and, presumably compelling fashion. The problem of distinguishing between rejection of a decision principle and failure to understand it is discussed.

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Metadata

Authors
Slovic, P., & Tversky, A.
Venue
Behavioral Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1974-11
Volume
19
Issue
6
Pages
368-373
ISSN
  • 1092-7026 (ISSN-L)
  • 0005-7940
  • 1099-1743
DOI
10.1002/bs.3830190603
OpenAlex
W2092927190
Cited by
599
References
7
FWCI
1.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Who accepts Savage's axiom? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1002/bs.3830190603
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Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1974). Who accepts Savage's axiom? Behavioral Science. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830190603

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.