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Who accepts Savage's axiom?
Abstract
Many decision theorists believe that the axioms of rational choice are similar to the principles of logic in the sense that no reasonable person who understands them would wish to violate them. The present study questions this view by investigating the acceptability of a key axiom underlying expected utility theory—Savage's independence principle. Persistent violations of this axiom were observed, even after it was presented to subjects in a clear and, presumably compelling fashion. The problem of distinguishing between rejection of a decision principle and failure to understand it is discussed.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Slovic, P., & Tversky, A.
- Venue
- Behavioral Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1974-11
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 368-373
- ISSN
- 1092-7026 (ISSN-L)
- 0005-7940
- 1099-1743
- OpenAlex
- W2092927190
- Cited by
- 599
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 1.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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