The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Industry self‐regulation and adverse selection: a comparison across four trade association programs
Open accessAbstract
In an attempt to avoid costly regulation and liability as a result of externalities, a number of trade associations have promoted industry self‐regulation – the voluntary association of firms to control their collective behavior. However, previous studies have found that, without explicit sanctions for malfeasance, such self‐regulatory programs are likely to attract more polluting firms. In this paper, we examine four environmental self‐regulatory programs in the chemical, textile, and pulp and paper industries. Using a sample of over 4000 firms within these industries, we find evidence that in at least one program more polluting firms tended to join, while in another cleaner firms were more likely to join. We propose that differences in the structure of the programs drive the appearance of this form of adverse selection. In particular, we speculate that only when self‐regulatory programs have explicit sanctions for malfeasance may they avoid adverse selection problems. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
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Cites
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Green Innovation and Financial Performance: An Institutional Approach
Aguilera-Caracuel, J., & Ortiz-de-Mandojana, N. (2013) · Organization & Environment · doi:10.1177/1086026613507931 · Cited by 624
The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievements and Limitations
Vogel, D. (2010) · Business & Society · doi:10.1177/0007650309343407 · Cited by 580
Voluntary agreements to improve environmental quality: symbolic and substantive cooperation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lenox, M. J., & Nash, J.
- Venue
- Business Strategy and the Environment
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-10-24
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 343-356
- ISSN
- 0964-4733 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0836
- OpenAlex
- W2056468434
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 20.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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