Environment, Self‐Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care*
Abstract
This study examines the role of self‐regulation as a strategy for environment protection. In particular it explores the chemical industry's Responsible Care Program. Responsible Care is afar‐reaching and sophisticated self‐regulatory scheme intended to reduce chemical accidents and pollution, to build industry credibility through improved performance and increased communication, and to involve the community in decision making. The study identifies the collective action problems and other weaknesses of Responsible Care and argues that a more effective approach to environmental regulation of the chemical industry would be tripartite, involving co‐regulation and a range of third party oversight mechanisms.
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A tripartite approach involving co-regulation and third-party oversight mechanisms may be a viable option for Responsible Care.
“However, a tripartite approach, involving co-regulation and a range of third-party oversight mechanisms, may well be a viable option (Gunningham 1995).”
From Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective (1997) · cites this paper as Gunningham 1995
In the chemical industry's Responsible Care program, collective action problems and the temptation to free ride mean that self-regulation and its related codes of practice alone will be insufficient to achieve the goal of improving environmental performance.
“For example, in the case of the chemical industry's Responsible Care program, even though the industry as a whole has a self-interest in improving its environmental performance, collective action problems and the temptation to free ride mean that self-regulation and its related codes of practice alone will be insufficient to achieve that goal.”
From Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective (1997) · cites this paper as Gunningham 1995
Cites
Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers
Jackall, R. (1988) · International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society · doi:10.1007/bf01390690 · Cited by 1,296 · see citing works
Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action
Runge, C. F. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130438 · Cited by 290 · see citing works
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Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective
Gunningham, N., & Rees, J. (1997) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033 · Cited by 572 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Causes and Consequences of Private Food Governance
Fuchs, D., & Kalfagianni, A. (2010) · Business and Politics · doi:10.2202/1469-3569.1319 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
- Authors
- GUNNINGHAM, N.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- GUNNINGHAM, NEIL
- ORCID
- GUNNINGHAM, NEIL
- Venue
- Law & Policy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-109
- ISSN
- 0265-8240 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9930
- OpenAlex
- W2015737526
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 10.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Law & Policy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Administrative Law and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Governance, Compliance, and Sustainability
- Keywords
- responsible care, chemical industry, self-regulation, environmental protection, chemical accidents, pollution reduction, collective action problems, co-regulation, third-party oversight, community participation, environmental regulation
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