The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Limits of Business Self-Regulation
Abstract
While business self-regulation is often invoked as an alternative to government regulation, it has never lived up to its promise. This article contends that the undersupply of business self-regulation is due to the fact that its benefits typically take the form of public goods. It is notorious that public goods, because they are vulnerable to free-rider problems, are inefficiently supplied by the market. Ironically, then the principal means that we rely on to regulate business—the market—undercuts business9s capacity for self-regulation in cases of market failure. Moreover, the extreme fragmentation of business in the U.S. and the barriers we have placed in the way of inter-firm collective action have left us heavily dependent on government to regulate market failures. In other societies, collective action by business, typically administered by a peak organization, has provided an alternative to increased government control.
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A firm may withhold its contribution to a public good not because of a rational calculation of costs and benefits, but because it lacks assurance that other firms will contribute their fair share.
“On this view: the group member (i.e., firm) does not withhold its contribution to the public good (e.g., a cleaner environment) based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits involved . . .but rather does so because it is unable to obtain the necessary assurance that other firms will contribute their fair share.11 (Maitland 1985: 134)”
From Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective (1997) · cites this paper as Maitland 1985
Citations
Cites
Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action
Runge, C. F. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130438 · Cited by 290
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 28
- 10.4159/9780674041660 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1002/bs.3830160507 · DOI
- 10.1108/eb039015 · DOI
- Wilson James Q., 1973, Political Organizations
- Leone Robert A., 1979, Government Regulation of Business: Its Growth, Impact, and Future, 34
- 10.2307/41165091 · DOI
- Arrow Kenneth J., 1973, Public Policy, 21, 315
- McKie James W., 1974, Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament, 103
- Hardin's Garrett, 1968, Science, 162, 1247
- 10.2307/41165031 · DOI
- Porter Michael, Competitive Strategy, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1980), p. 230.
- Grumbly Thomas P., 1982, Social Regulation: Strategies for Reform, 97
- Conte Christopher, “Transport Agency's Dole Vows to Restrict Traffic at 6 Busy Airports if Carriers Don't,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1984, p. 10.
- Olson Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 47–48.
- Preston Lee, 1975, Private Management and Public Policy
- See on this point the remarks of Walter A. Haas, Jr., of Levi Strauss quoted in Silk Leonard, Vogel David, Ethics and Profits (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1976), pp. 25–27.
- Rawls John, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 270, 269.
- Olson, Rise and Decline, op. cit., pp. 47–48.
- Shonfield Andrew, Modern Capitalism, (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 245.
- Baunthal Gerard, The Federation of German Industries in Politics, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 56–57.
- 10.4159/harvard.9780674366299 · DOI
- Kelman Steven, 1981, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy
- Ibid., pp. 117 and 158–61.
- Ibid., pp. 154–55.
- In Bauer, Pool and Dexter's classic study, a lopsided majority of the businessmen with opinions on the subject supported free trade, but when they contacted members of Conress it was invariably to ask for protection. Bauer Raymond A., de S. Pool Ithiel, Dexter Lewis, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade, (New York: Atherton, 1963), p. 221. The doyen of the pluralist school in American political science has recently remarked that “by emphasizing aspects of the self that are enhanced by … segmented gains, organizational pluralism helps to produce in political actors a set of perceptions and beliefs, even a persistent political culture, in which the absence of a common, public or widely shared set of interests is a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Dahl Robert A., Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 44.
- Wilson James Q., 1979, Political Organizations
- Wilson, op. cit., pp. 146–47, 34, 153–56 and passim.
- Wilson, op. cit., p. 83; see generally chapter 5.
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Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective
Gunningham, N., & Rees, J. (1997) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/1467-9930.t01-1-00033 · Cited by 572
Metadata
- Authors
- Maitland, I.
- Corresponding author
- Maitland, Ian
- Venue
- California Management Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1985-04
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 132-147
- ISSN
- 0008-1256 (ISSN-L)
- 2162-8564
- OpenAlex
- W2004611347
- Cited by
- 92
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- California Management Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Keywords
- industry self-regulation, public goods, free-rider problem, market failure, government regulation, business fragmentation
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