Principles in judgment/decision making research pertinent to legal proceedings
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Principles in the judgment/decision making literature relevant to the legal community are reviewed. These principles are divided into four areas: the decision process itself, communicating a judgment to others, evaluating a decision, and possible ways of “debiasing.” Several influences on the decision process are enumerated, among them being insufficient consideration of base rates, selective memory for relevant material, the framing of the decision in either the domain of losses or the domain of gains, and consideration of the “cues to causation.” Particular attention is paid to suboptimal consideration of covariation information. In communicating the decision to others the two most prominent findings are overconfidence in expressing one's decision and the inability to describe accurately the bases of one's decision. Evaluating a decision is plagued by two biases. The first is the hindsight bias. After an event has occurred we tend to exaggerate how easily we could have predicted the event beforehand. The second is the outcome bias. We tend to base our evaluation of the decision upon the evaluation of the outcome. Among the debiasing techniques mentioned are the admonition to “consider the opposite” of the preferred option, the reduction of reliance on memory, and the use of decision aids.
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Cites
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Cited by
First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias
Rabin, M., & Schrag, J. L. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399555945 · Cited by 1,001
The More You Ask For, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts
CHAPMAN, G. B., & BORNSTEIN, B. H. (1996) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0720(199612)10:6<519::aid-acp417>3.0.co;2-5 · Cited by 288
The role of psychological testing in forensic assessment.
Heilbrun, K. (1992) · Law and Human Behavior · doi:10.1007/bf01044769 · Cited by 210
Neal, T. M. S., & Brodsky, S. L. (2016) · Psychology, Public Policy, and Law · doi:10.1037/law0000077 · Cited by 114
Metadata
- Authors
- Arkes, H. R.
- Venue
- Behavioral Sciences & the Law
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989-09
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 429-456
- ISSN
- 0735-3936 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0798
- OpenAlex
- W2028757456
- Cited by
- 45
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 1.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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