The DOI matches its Crossref record; 83 of the 83 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Board characteristics and integrated reporting quality: an agency theory perspective
Abstract
Integrated reporting is the latest novelty in the corporate reporting field. It is a tool capable of better representing the capacity of companies to create value over time. In recent years, attention to this new reporting tool has grown in both professional and academic fields. However, despite past research that has analysed many aspects of integrated reporting, the integrated reporting quality and its determinants are still little explored. This study aims to fill this gap by analysing the effect of board characteristics on integrated reporting quality according to an agency theory approach. The findings, based on a sample of 134 international firms, show a positive relationship between the size, independence, diversity, and activity of a board with integrated reporting quality. This study contributes to enriching literature in this area in various ways. First, it broadens the scope of application of agency theory; second, it identifies further internal determinants of integrated reporting quality. This is the first study that analyses the impact of the characteristics of a board as a determining factor of integrated reporting quality.
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Cites
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Cited by
Extending the benefits of ESG disclosure: The effect on the cost of debt financing
Raimo, N., Caragnano, A., Zito, M., Vitolla, F., & Mariani, M. (2021) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.2134 · Cited by 558
Self-citationA Review of Corporate Reporting Transparency Quality: Current Status and Future Directions
Hewage, Y. M., Cooray, A., & Ahmed, R. (2026) · Australian Accounting Review · doi:10.1111/auar.70019 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Vitolla, F., Raimo, N., & Rubino, M.
- Venue
- Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2019-12-17
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1152-1163
- ISSN
- 1535-3958 (ISSN-L)
- 1535-3966
- OpenAlex
- W2995204751
- Cited by
- 472
- References
- 83
- FWCI
- 53.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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