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Cited by 12Misinformation and Its ImpactsParanormal Experiences and BeliefsSocial and Intergroup Psychology

Does Developing a Belief in One Conspiracy Theory Lead a Person to be More Likely to Believe in Others?

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Williams, Matt N., Marques, Mathew D., Kerr, John R., Hill, Stephen R., Ling, Mathew, Clarke, Edward J. R.·2025·European Journal of Social Psychology
DOI 10.1002/ejsp.3153
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Abstract

The monological belief system model suggests that—for at least a subset of people—developing a belief in one conspiracy theory will cause them to be more likely to believe in others. This model has been influential in the literature, but its core causal hypothesis has never been credibly tested. We therefore tested it in two longitudinal studies. Study 1 used a sample from New Zealand and Australia ( N = 498), with 7 monthly waves. Study 2 (preregistered) used a sample from New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom ( N = 978), with 13 monthly waves. We applied random intercept cross‐lagged panel models, permitting a credible causal identification strategy, albeit we cannot rule out time‐varying confounds. We find that increased belief in a conspiracy theory at one wave did (on average) predict increased belief in other conspiracies at the next wave, although the estimated coefficients were small.

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  • Belief in one conspiracy theory leaves users predisposed to belief in others.

    “others (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018; Williams et al., 2025).”

    From "Just Asking Questions": Doing Our Own Research on Conspiratorial Ideation by Generative AI Chatbots (2026) · cites this paper as Williams et al., 2025

    The General Discussion reports positive cross-lagged effects in both studies, consistent with belief in one conspiracy theory increasing belief in others. It also says the causal inference is uncertain because of threats to internal validity, so the claim’s unqualified causal wording goes beyond the findings. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Research works printed but not linked: 29

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Williams, M. N., Marques, M. D., Kerr, J. R., Hill, S. R., Ling, M., & Clarke, E. J. R.
Affiliations
  • Massey University (NZ)
  • La Trobe University (AU)
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
  • Deakin University (AU)
  • Philipps University of Marburg (DE)
Corresponding author
Williams, Matt N.
ORCID
Venue
European Journal of Social Psychology
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2025-02-17
Volume
55
Issue
4
Pages
554-564
ISSN
  • 0046-2772 (ISSN-L)
  • 1099-0992
DOI
10.1002/ejsp.3153
OpenAlex
W4407670757
Cited by
12
References
11
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 4
FWCI
13.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • European Journal of Social Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Deakin Research Online (Deakin University) (cc-by)
Funders
  • Massey University (RM22245)
  • Marsden Fund (MFP‐MAU2103)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
conspiracy theories, random intercept cross-lagged panel model

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