Cited by 59Misinformation and Its ImpactsParanormal Experiences and BeliefsSocial and Intergroup Psychology

How (Ir)rational is it to believe in contradictory conspiracy theories?

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Lukić, Petar, Žeželj, Iris, Stanković, Biljana·2019·Europe’s Journal of Psychology

Abstract

There is evidence that not only believing in one conspiracy theory (CT) makes a person more probable to believe in others, however unrelated their content is, but that people can even believe in contradictory CTs about a single event. After piloting locally relevant conspiracy theories on a convenient Serbian speaking sample (N = 152), we sought to replicate this finding on a larger sample (N = 252), but introduced several changes. We differentiated necessarily and probably mutually exclusive CTs, and interviewed the participants who answered contradictory to understand the reasoning behind it. The participants were more prone to endorse probably than necessarily exclusive items (we registered positive correlations in former and no correlation or negative correlation in later). Two strategies enabled them to overcome the contradiction: (a) distilling the crucial content and downplaying other information and (b) treating the contradictory scenarios as possible versions of events. Taken together, these results indicate that participants are not as irrational as sometimes portrayed.

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Authors
Lukić, P., Žeželj, I., & Stanković, B.
Affiliations
University of Belgrade (RS)
Corresponding author
Lukić, Petar
Venue
Europe’s Journal of Psychology
Published
2019-02-28
Volume
15
Issue
1
Pages
94-107
ISSN
1841-0413 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2919352849
Cited by
59
References
27
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 2
FWCI
16.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Europe’s Journal of Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PsychOpen Gold (Leibniz Institute for Psychology) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Faculty of Philosophy (University of Belgrade) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Europe’s Journal of Psychology (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Psychology Archives (cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
conspiracy theories, contradictory beliefs, irrationality, replication, reasoning strategies, cognitive dissonance

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