The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Subjective confidence in forecasts
Abstract
Forecasts have little value to decision makers unless it is known how much confidence to place in them. Those expressions of confidence have, in turn, little value unless forecasters are able to assess the limits of their own knowledge accurately Previous research has shown very robust patterns in the judgements of individuals who have not received special training in confidence assessment: Knowledge generally increases as confidence increases. However, it increases too swiftly, with a doubling of confidence being associated with perhaps a 50 per cent increase in knowledge. With all but the easiest of tasks, people tend to be overconfident regarding how much they know These results have typically been derived from studies of judgements of general knowledge. The present study found that they also pertained to confidence in forecasts. Indeed, the confidence‐knowledge curves observed here were strikingly similar to those observed previously. The only deviation was the discovery that a substantial minority of judges never expressed complete confidence in any of their forecasts. These individuals also proved to be better assessors of the extent of their own knowledge Apparently confidence in forecasts is determined by processes similar to those that determine confidence in general knowledge. Decision makers can use forecasters assessments in a relative sense, in order to predict when they are more and less likely to be correct. However, they should be hesitant to take confidence assessments literally. Someone is more likely to be right when he or she is ‘certain’than when he or she is ‘fairly confident’; but there is no guarantee that the certain forecast will come true.
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Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1980) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(80)90052-5 · Cited by 375
Self-citation
Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Self-citation“Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2648573 · Cited by 2,298
Metadata
- Authors
- Fischhoff, B., & MacGregor, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Forecasting
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1982-04
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 155-172
- ISSN
- 0277-6693 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-131X
- OpenAlex
- W2160592232
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 5.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.