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Cited by 2,349Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentLeadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies

The Affect Heuristic

Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G.·2002·Heuristics and Biases
DOI 10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025
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Abstract

This chapter introduces a theoretical framework that describes the importance of affect in guiding judgments and decisions. As used here, affect means the specific quality of “goodness” or “badness” (1) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus. Affective responses occur rapidly and automatically – note how quickly you sense the feelings associated with the stimulus words treasure or hate . We argue that reliance on such feelings can be characterized as the affect heuristic . In this chapter, we trace the development of the affect heuristic across a variety of research paths followed by ourselves and many others. We also discuss some of the important practical implications resulting from ways that this heuristic impacts our daily lives. BACKGROUND Although affect has long played a key role in many behavioral theories, it has rarely been recognized as an important component of human judgment and decision making. Perhaps befitting its rationalistic origins, the main focus of descriptive decision research has been cognitive, rather than affective. When principles of utility maximization appeared to be descriptively inadequate, Simon (1956) oriented the field toward problem-solving and information-processing models based on bounded rationality. The work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) demonstrated how boundedly rational individuals use such heuristics as a…

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  • The bias in LLMs may originate from the inherent limitations of human cognition.

    “The bias in LLMs may originate from the inherent limitations of human cognition.”

    From Justice or Prejudice? Quantifying Biases in LLM-as-a-Judge (2024) · cites this paper as Slovic et al., 2002

  • LLMs perform inconsistently when dealing with sentiment bias, potentially reflecting the phenomenon that humans are often influenced by emotions when making judgments.

    “For instance, LLMs perform inconsistently when dealing with sentiment bias, potentially reflecting the phenomenon that humans are often influenced by emotions when making judgments.”

    From Justice or Prejudice? Quantifying Biases in LLM-as-a-Judge (2024) · cites this paper as Slovic et al., 2002

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Authors
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G.
Affiliations
Decision Research (US)
ORCID
Venue
Heuristics and Biases
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2002-07-08
Pages
397-420
DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025
OpenAlex
W2070203783
Cited by
2,349
References
108
Citations by year
2026: 27 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 133 · 2020: 142 · 2019: 127 · 2018: 151 · 2017: 144 · 2016: 142 · 2015: 180 · 2014: 150 · 2013: 156 · 2012: 131
FWCI
39.75
Type
book chapter
Language
fr
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 3620 d)
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Leadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies
Keywords
affect heuristic, affect, judgment and decision making, heuristics, bounded rationality, emotional responses, emotional valence, utility maximization, availability heuristic, representativeness heuristic, anchoring and adjustment, elimination by aspects

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