The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate governance and firm efficiency: evidence from China's publicly listed firms
Abstract
This paper applies a two‐stage, double bootstrapping data envelope analysis approach to investigate whether and to what extent various distinctive corporate governance practices affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2002. We find that firm efficiency is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U‐shaped, indicating the presence of tunneling activities by the largest shareholder. Among three types of controlling shareholder, state exerts the most negative impact on firm efficiency, followed by state‐owned legal entities. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. It shows that the proportion of outside directors and the number of board meetings are positively associated with firm efficiency, suggesting that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, our findings illustrate that restructuring state‐owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Citations
Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · cited 2×
“…designed to mitigate agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in a company, protect the interests of all stakeholders, improve firm performance, and ensure that investors get an adequate return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al, 2000).”
BackgroundCooper, W. W., Seiford, L. M., & Tone, K. (2000) · doi:10.1007/b109347 · Cited by 1,079
On aggregate Farrell efficiencies
Färe, R., & Zelenyuk, V. (2003) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00259-x · Cited by 171 · cited 1×
“which is based on the theory developed by Färe and Zelenyuk (2003). As shown in Table 4, the weighted-mean and the median are very close.”
Method
Cited by
Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective
Jiang, F., & Kim, K. A. (2015) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.010 · Cited by 931
Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective
Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., & Gallego-Álvarez, I. (2020) · Review of Managerial Science · doi:10.1007/s11846-019-00330-x · Cited by 291
Metadata
- Authors
- Lin, C., Ma, Y., & Su, D.
- Venue
- Managerial and Decision Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-10-29
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 193-209
- ISSN
- 0143-6570 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-1468
- OpenAlex
- W2011794461
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 23.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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