Entrepreneurial signaling to attract resources: the case of franchising
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why firms and individuals reveal information is the subject of considerable theoretical research, but little empirical work has been possible due to a lack of suitable data. In this paper we examine why entrepreneurs selling business opportunities (franchisors) reveal information regarding potential profits (termed earnings claims). Empirical analysis shows that: first, contrary to theory, only a small percentage of franchisors claim; and, second, the franchisors that do claim have lower costs or are responding to competition. In particular, the prediction of theoretical models from economics that resource providers will not transact if information is not disclosed is not supported; resource providers can and do make significant investments even when entrepreneurs refuse to disclose information. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Citations
Cites
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
DEEPHOUSE, D. L. (1996) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/256722 · Cited by 1,697
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Franchising: A Review and Avenues to Greater Theoretical Diversity
Combs, J. G., Michael, S. C., & Castrogiovanni, G. J. (2004) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/j.jm.2004.06.006 · Cited by 450
Self-citationOwnership redirection in franchised channels
Dant, R. P., Kaufmann, P. J., & Paswan, A. K. (1992) · Journal of Public Policy & Marketing · doi:10.1177/074391569201100104 · Cited by 129
Cited by
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310388419 · Cited by 6,735
Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding
Ahlers, G. K. C., Cumming, D., Günther, C., & Schweizer, D. (2015) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/etap.12157 · Cited by 1,848
Application of signaling theory in management research: Addressing major gaps in theory
Taj, S. A. (2016) · European Management Journal · doi:10.1016/j.emj.2016.02.001 · Cited by 369
Liu, F., Xiao, B., Lim, E. T. K., & Tan, C.-W. (2017) · Internet Research · doi:10.1108/intr-09-2016-0280 · Cited by 100
“Entrepreneurship studies, for example, have considered how private equity (Janney and Folta, 2006), and earnings (Michael, 2009) drive the decisions of potential investors.”
BackgroundA systematic review of international franchising
Alon, I., Apriliyanti, I. D., & Henríquez Parodi, M. C. (2021) · Multinational Business Review · doi:10.1108/mbr-01-2020-0019 · Cited by 106
Metadata
- Authors
- Michael, S. C.
- Venue
- Managerial and Decision Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-02-10
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 405-422
- ISSN
- 0143-6570 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-1468
- OpenAlex
- W2027225182
- Cited by
- 84
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 10.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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