The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Effects of executive departures on the performance of acquired firms
Abstract
Using a sample of 96 acquisitions that occurred between 1980 and 1984, this study concludes that the departure of executives from acquired firms is harmful to post acquisition performance. The negative effects of departures of the highest ranking executives (such as CEOs, Presidents, and Chairmen) appear to be most severe. Acquisition relatedness, contrary to hypothesis, did not moderate the departure-performance relationship. Finally we find that providing one or more executives with top management team status in the newly combined firm leads to better postacquisition performance. Our study implies that executives from acquired firms are an intrinsic component of the acquired firm's resource base, and that their retention is an important determinant of postacquisition performance. Our evidence supports the view that executives are important to postacquisition performance, and we believe that this evidence extends to other restructuring contexts as well.
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Cites
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Cited by
Theory and research in strategic management: Swings of a pendulum
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Wan, W. P., & Yiu, D. (1999) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920639902500307 · Cited by 1,364
Acquiring New Technologies and Capabilities: A Grounded Model of Acquisition Implementation
Ranft, A. L., & Lord, M. D. (2002) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.13.4.420.2952 · Cited by 787
The managerial rents model: Theory and empirical analysis
Castanias, R. (2001) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/s0149-2063(01)00117-9 · Cited by 710
DETERMINANTS OF ACQUISITION INTEGRATION LEVEL: A DECISION-MAKING PERSPECTIVE.
PABLO, A. L. (1994) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256601 · Cited by 543
Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K. A., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503 · Cited by 502
Metadata
- Authors
- Cannella, A. A., & Hambrick, D. C.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- S1
- Pages
- 137-152
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2031467401
- Cited by
- 393
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 6.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
