The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Distinguishing costs of cooperation and control in alliances
Abstract
Firms simultaneously face the need to cooperate with and control an alliance partner. To complement the transaction cost perspective's emphasis on the need to control and limit opportunistic behavior, we examine the sources and impact of the cooperation costs incurred in order to work with a partner. We propose that these costs increase with greater joint task complexity and interpartner diversity, and perceptions of equitable behavior affect the perceptions of these costs. Hypotheses derived from the framework are tested in a sample of 231 contractual alliances between architects and general contractors in the Hong Kong construction industry. We find that both cooperation costs and transaction costs affect the level of time and effort a manager expends on an alliance, supporting our fundamental proposition that the costs of cooperation and control are conceptually and empirically distinct. We argue that cooperation costs should be incorporated into studies that compare the choice of alternative partners and alliance structures, as well as among the broader categories of market, hierarchy, and hybrid governance forms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Cites
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The Two Facets of Collaboration: Cooperation and Coordination in Strategic Alliances
Gulati, R., Wohlgezogen, F., & Zhelyazkov, P. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2012.691646 · Cited by 768
Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type
Hoetker, G., & Mellewigt, T. (2009) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.775 · Cited by 525
Alliance Portfolios: A Review and Research Agenda
Wassmer, U. (2010) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206308328484 · Cited by 510
Explaining Variations in Client Extra Costs between Software Projects Offshored to India
Dibbern, J., Winkler, J. K., & Heinzl, A. (2008) · MADOC (University of Mannheim) · doi:10.7892/boris.51792 · Cited by 455
Explaining Variations in Client Extra Costs between Software Projects Offshored to India1
Dibbern, J., Winkler, J., & Heinzl, A. (2008) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25148843 · Cited by 387
Metadata
- Authors
- White, S., & Siu‐Yun Lui, S.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-08-25
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 913-932
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2138773780
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 24.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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