Strategic promotion tournaments and worker performance
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this analysis I study promotion schemes as human resource management strategies by which the firm can realize strategic goals by motivating workers to higher levels of effort and performance. Using information on promotions, wages, and performance for professional workers in a cross‐section of establishments in four metropolitan areas of the United States, I investigate empirically the proposition that firms strategically organize promotion tournaments to motivate workers to higher levels of performance. I present evidence suggesting that relative performance of workers determines promotions, supporting the notion of internal promotion competitions in which internal hiring policies and fixed job slots combine to create competitions among workers of a given rank in a firm. I then estimate a structural model of promotion tournaments that simultaneously accounts for worker and firm behavior and how the interaction of these behaviors gives rise to promotions. The results are consistent with the prediction of tournament theory that workers are motivated by larger spreads. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Citations
Cites
Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage
Barney, J. (1991) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920639101700108 · Cited by 48,334
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality
Mischel, W. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0035002 · Cited by 3,181
Understanding HRM–Firm Performance Linkages: The Role of the “Strength” of the HRM System
Bowen, D. E., & Ostroff, C. (2004) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2004.12736076 · Cited by 2,996
Cited by
Bosses' Perceptions of Family-Work Conflict and Women's Promotability: Glass Ceiling Effects
Hoobler, J. M., Wayne, S. J., & Lemmon, G. (2009) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.44633700 · Cited by 460
Tournament Theory: Thirty Years of Contests and Competitions
Connelly, B. L., Tihanyi, L., Crook, T. R., & Gangloff, K. A. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313498902 · Cited by 338
“However, some contexts call for tournaments Connelly et al. / Tournament Theory 31 wherein participants and those running the tournament work together to determine outcomes (DeVaro, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialWu, Y., Lee, C.-C., Lee, C.-C., & Peng, D. (2022) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106510 · Cited by 268
Getting rid of performance ratings: Genius or folly? A debate
Adler, S., Campion, M., Colquitt, A., Grubb, A., Murphy, K., Ollander-Krane, R., & Pulakos, E. D. (2016) · Industrial and Organizational Psychology · doi:10.1017/iop.2015.106 · Cited by 230
“…in the same company in similar jobs is often considered to be an excellent predictor of performance after promotion (Beehr, Taber, & Walsh, 1980; DeVaro, 2006), and employees have a strong expectation that past performance should be a factor considered in promotion (De Pater, Van Vianen,…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- DeVaro, J.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-05-08
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 721-740
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2112707326
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 3.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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