Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 309

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 117 of the 117 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups

Kugler, Tamar, Kausel, Edgar E., Kocher, Martin G. · 2012 · WIREs Cognitive Science

Abstract

Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. Standard game theory assumes that individuals are rational, self‐interested decision makers—that is, decision makers are selfish, perfect calculators, and flawless executors of their strategies. A myriad of studies shows that these assumptions are problematic, at least when examining decisions made by individuals. In this article, we review the literature of the last 25 years on decision making by groups. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal–agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that group decisions are closer to the game‐theoretic assumption of rationality than individual decisions. Given that many real‐world decisions are made by groups, it is possible to argue that standard game theory is a better descriptive model than previously believed by experimental researchers. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:471–482. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1184 This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1002/wcs.1184

Cites

117 of 117 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 117 references

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Kugler, T., Kausel, E. E., & Kocher, M. G.
Venue
WIREs Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2012-05-11
Volume
3
Issue
4
Pages
471-482
ISSN
  • 1939-5078 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-5086
OpenAlex
W1996218653
Cited by
309
References
117
FWCI
47.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.