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Towards a hermeneutic shift in psychiatry

Open access
Bracken, Pat · 2014 · World Psychiatry
Cited by 55

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Psychiatry is currently going through a crisis of confidence 1. Some medical commentators have even questioned the very credibility of the profession 2. There are many indicators of this crisis. For example, leading up to the launch of DSM-5 by the American Psychiatric Association last year, the chairperson of the DSM-IV task force raised serious questions about the validity of the whole DSM process 3, echoing earlier criticisms by the chairperson of the DSM-III 4. It is clear that psychiatry has been a particular target of the marketing strategies of the pharmaceutical industry 5, strategies that have led to the corruption of evidence-based medicine in general 6. Much-heralded advances in antipsychotic psychopharmacology are now revealed as “spurious” 7. Academic psychiatry's attempt to transform itself into a sort of “applied neuroscience” 8 has consumed enormous resources but delivered very little for patients. A. Kleinman has called it an “extraordinary failure” and stated that “academic psychiatry has become more or less irrelevant to clinical practice” 9. In the U.S., where the practice of psychiatry has been most dominated by the DSM, neuroscience and the pharmaceutical industry, clinical work has become equated with the prescription of drugs. The New York Times carried a story in 2011 in which a psychiatrist spoke of having to train himself not to get too close to his patients and “not to get too interested in their problems” 10. Our discipline is in trouble. There are several dimensions to the current crisis, but one of the most important difficulties is around the perennial question of what is an appropriate epistemology for psychiatry. What sort of knowledge can we have with regard to mental illness and what sort of expertise is possible? The current technological paradigm that dominates psychiatric thought 11 is based on the idea that episodes of mental illness arise from abnormalities in specific neural, or psychological, pathways or processes. Furthermore, it assumes that these can be grasped with the same sort of de-contextualized, causal logic that is used to explain problems of the liver or lungs. The authority of psychiatry and the power invested in it are often justified on the basis that it possesses, or is on the way to possess, a science that can predict outcomes, based on an accurate map of the underlying processes 12. Therefore, debates about epistemology are not simply an intellectual exercise. Many psychiatrists feel that they cannot be “real doctors” unless their discipline is grounded in the natural science epistemology that guides the rest of medicine. In this short discussion, I do not intend to engage with the wider ethical and political dimensions of the current crisis; rather I simply wish to make the case that natural science methods reach their limits in the territory of mental health and illness. This is largely a territory of meanings, values and relationships, an assertion now supported by a large body of empirical evidence about how psychiatric interventions actually work 11. I argue that, if we are to be truly “evidence-based” in our discipline, we need a radical rethinking of our guiding epistemology: a move from reductionism to hermeneutics. Many people still believe that answers to the current crisis will emerge from an ever greater focus on neuroscience. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, a quintessentially technological view of the future, is being promoted as the way forward. It conceptualizes mental illnesses as brain disorders: “in contrast to neurological disorders with identifiable lesions, mental disorders can be addressed as disorders of brain circuits” 13. Furthermore, it assumes that “the dysfunction in neural circuits can be identified with the tools of clinical neuroscience”. However, others argue that there is also a need for “higher order” cognitive and computational approaches in addition to genetics and neuroscience in our attempts to map the mind and its disorders 14. Central to all these approaches is the assumption that the mind is simply another organ of the body, or that it can be equated with the brain. In this understanding, “meaning” is generated internally, within “the brain” or “the mind” 15. It is viewed as something that emerges from a series of underlying neurological and/or cognitive processes, processes that are open to scientific investigation and explanation. Meaning, therefore, is something that can be explained fully in the terms of neuroscience or cognitive science models. This is what is meant by the term “reductionism”. I believe that these approaches are simply inadequate. One of the major insights of 20th century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty was the realization that meaning is not something that happens inside an individual mind or brain, but instead comes into our lives from the social practices that shape the world around us. It is in and through this world that we grow into huma

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  • Psychiatry beyond the current paradigm

    Bracken, P., Thomas, P., Timimi, S., Asen, E., Behr, G., Beuster, C., Bhunnoo, S., Browne, I., Chhina, N., Double, D., et al. (2012) · British Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.112.109447 · Cited by 474 · cited 3×

    “What sort of knowledge can we have with regard to mental illness and what sort of expertise is possible? The current technological paradigm that dominates psychiatric thought (11) is based on the idea that episodes of mental illness arise from abnormalities in specific neural, or psychological, pathways or processes.”
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Metadata

Authors
Bracken, P.
Venue
World Psychiatry
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2014-10
Volume
13
Issue
3
Pages
241-243
ISSN
1723-8617 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2015530754
Cited by
55
References
1
FWCI
18.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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Bracken, P. (2014). Towards a hermeneutic shift in psychiatry. World Psychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20148

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