The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The nature of psychiatric disorders
Open accessAbstract
A foundational question for the discipline of psychiatry is the nature of psychiatric disorders. What kinds of things are they? In this paper, I review and critique three major relevant theories: realism, pragmatism and constructivism. Realism assumes that the content of science is real and independent of human activities. I distinguish two “flavors” of realism: chemistry‐based, for which the paradigmatic example is elements of the periodic table, and biology‐based, for which the paradigm is species. The latter is a much better fit for psychiatry. Pragmatism articulates a sensible approach to psychiatric disorders just seeking categories that perform well in the world. But it makes no claim about the reality of those disorders. This is problematic, because we have a duty to advocate for our profession and our patients against other physicians who never doubt the reality of the disorders they treat. Constructivism has been associated with anti‐psychiatry activists, but we should admit that social forces play a role in the creation of our diagnoses, as they do in many sciences. However, truly socially constructed psychiatric disorders are rare. I then describe powerful arguments against a realist theory of psychiatric disorders. Because so many prior psychiatric diagnoses have been proposed and then abandoned, can we really claim that our current nosologies have it right? Much of our current nosology arose from a series of historical figures and events which could have gone differently. If we re‐run the tape of history over and over again, the DSM and ICD would not likely have the same categories on every iteration. Therefore, we should argue more confidently for the reality of broader constructs of psychiatric illness rather than our current diagnostic categories, which remain tentative. Finally, instead of thinking that our disorders are true because they correspond to clear entities in the world, we should consider a coherence theory of truth by which disorders become more true when they fit better into what else we know about the world. In our ongoing project to study and justify the nature of psychiatric disorders, we ought to be broadly pragmatic but not lose sight of an underlying commitment, despite the associated difficulties, to the reality of psychiatric illness.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Genome-wide association study of 14,000 cases of seven common diseases and 3,000 shared controls
The Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium, Management Committee, Burton, P. R., Clayton, D. G., Cardon, L. R., Craddock, N., Deloukas, P., Duncanson, A., Kwiatkowski, D. P., McCarthy, M. I., et al. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05911 · Cited by 9,442
Biological insights from 108 schizophrenia-associated genetic loci
Schizophrenia Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium (2014) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature13595 · Cited by 7,577
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1970) · Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171434.009 · Cited by 4,649
Initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome
The Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04072 · Cited by 2,459
Establishment of Diagnostic Validity in Psychiatric Illness: Its Application to Schizophrenia
ROBINS, E., & GUZE, S. B. (1970) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/ajp.126.7.983 · Cited by 2,243
Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory
Hacking, I. (1995) · doi:10.1515/9781400821686 · Cited by 1,457
Psychometric perspectives on diagnostic systems
Borsboom, D. (2008) · Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1002/jclp.20503 · Cited by 691
A Metaphysics of Psychopathology
Zachar, P. (2014) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027045.001.0001 · Cited by 177
Cramer, A. O. J., Borsboom, D., Aggen, S. H., & Kendler, K. S. (2012) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s003329171100211x · Cited by 168
Self-citation
Cited by
Robinaugh, D. J., Hoekstra, R. H. A., Toner, E. R., & Borsboom, D. (2020) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291719003404 · Cited by 861
“…another group of theorists independently proposed that mental disorders can be conceptualized as ‘mechanistic property clusters’ (MPCs): kinds unified not by a shared underlying essence, but by causal relations among the features of the disorder (Kendler, 2016; Kendler et al., 2011; Zachar, 2015).”
BackgroundThe new field of ‘precision psychiatry’
Fernandes, B. S., Williams, L. M., Steiner, J., Leboyer, M., Carvalho, A. F., & Berk, M. (2017) · BMC Medicine · doi:10.1186/s12916-017-0849-x · Cited by 549
Annual Research Review: The transdiagnostic revolution in neurodevelopmental disorders
Astle, D. E., Holmes, J., Kievit, R., & Gathercole, S. E. (2022) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/jcpp.13481 · Cited by 384
Quantifying resilience of humans and other animals
Scheffer, M., Bolhuis, J. E., Borsboom, D., Buchman, T. G., Gijzel, S. M. W., Goulson, D., Kammenga, J. E., Kemp, B., van de Leemput, I. A., Levin, S., et al. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1810630115 · Cited by 355
Classification of common human diseases derived from shared genetic and environmental determinants
Wang, K., Gaitsch, H., Poon, H., Cox, N. J., & Rzhetsky, A. (2017) · Nature Genetics · doi:10.1038/ng.3931 · Cited by 242
Metadata
- Authors
- Kendler, K. S.
- Venue
- World Psychiatry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-02
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-12
- ISSN
- 1723-8617 (ISSN-L)
- 2051-5545
- OpenAlex
- W2303171129
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 105.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.