Causal Attribution as a Search for Underlying Mechanisms: An Explanation of the Conjunction Fallacy and the Discounting Principle
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We propose that causal attribution involves searching for underlying mechanism information (i.e., the processes underlying the relationship between the cause and the effect). This processing account can explain both the conjunction effect (i.e., conjunctive explanations being rated more probable than their components) and the discounting effect (i.e., the effect of one cause being discounted when another cause is already known to be true). When two explanations cohere with respect to a single mechanism, they would be judged to be more likely than a single explanation which partly supports that mechanism. When the two explanations imply two separate mechanisms, one would be discounted. In Experiment 1, both effects occurred with mechanism-based explanations but not with covariation-based explanations in which the cause-effect relationship was phrased in terms of statistical covariations without referring to mechanisms. In Experiments 2 and 3, the amount of the discounting and conjunction effects varied depending on the relationships between specific mechanisms in the two given explanations. We discuss why the current results pose difficulties for previous attribution models.
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Citations
Cites
The processes of causal attribution.
Kelley, H. H. (1973) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0034225 · Cited by 4,025 · cited 2×
“Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1991, 1992; Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987; Kelley, 1967, 1973 ), it has also been criticized as having ‘‘distorted our ways of thinking about how attributions are made’’ (Leddo et al., 1984, p. 933).”
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“Although not explicitly referring to the role of mechanism information, a number of studies by Pennington and Hastie (1986, 1988, 1992) showed the importance of story construction in decision-making.”
BackgroundExplanation-based decision making: Effects of memory structure on judgment.
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Cited by
Barsalou, L. W. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002149 · Cited by 6,887
From covariation to causation: A causal power theory.
Cheng, P. W. (1997) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.104.2.367 · Cited by 1,206
Situated simulation in the human conceptual system
Barsalou, L. (2003) · Language and Cognitive Processes · doi:10.1080/01690960344000026 · Cited by 979
“In causal reasoning, Ahn and Bailenson (1996) argued that imagining causal mechanisms is central to causal reasoning, where these imagined mechanisms could be implemented as simulations.”
BackgroundKuhn, D. (2001) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00302 · Cited by 369
The cognitive basis of model-based reasoning in science
Nersessian, N. J. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.008 · Cited by 313
Metadata
- Authors
- Ahn, W.-K., & Bailenson, J.
- Venue
- Cognitive Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-08
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 82-123
- ISSN
- 0010-0285 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2157730055
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 3.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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