The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How do People Know?
Abstract
To fully understand processes of knowing and knowledge acquisition, it is necessary to examine people's understanding of their own knowing. Individual and developmental differences in what it means to know something, and hence in the criteria for justifying knowledge claims, have potentially wide-ranging implications. In providing support for a claim, young children have difficulty differentiating explanation of why a claim makes sense and evidence that the claim is true. Epistemic understanding progresses developmentally, but substantial variation remains among adults, with few adults achieving understanding of the complementary strengths and weaknesses of evidence and explanation in argument. Epistemic understanding shapes intellectual values and hence the disposition (as opposed to competence) to exercise intellectual skills. Only its most advanced levels support a disposition to engage in the intellectual effort that reasoned argument entails. The sample case of juror reasoning illustrates how epistemic understanding underlies and shapes intellectual performance.
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Cites
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.197 · Cited by 2,517 · cited 1×
“Intellectual values, as conceived in our own recent research on them (Kuhn, Clark, & Huang, 2000), reflect one’s conviction that intellectual investment is worthwhile, and thus differ from related constructs such as the degree to which one enjoys intellectual activities (Cacioppo et al., 1996).”
BackgroundMotivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing”
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.2.263 · Cited by 2,379 · cited 1×
“…decontextualize, willingness to consider alternatives, actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 1988), need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), and need for closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), and reported modest correlations among scales designed to measure such constructs.”
BackgroundKuhn, D. (1991) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571350 · Cited by 2,094
Self-citationShafir, E. (1993) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(93)90034-s · Cited by 1,453
Accountability and complexity of thought.
Tetlock, P. E. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.74 · Cited by 995
Children and adults as intuitive scientists.
Kuhn, D. (1989) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.96.4.674 · Cited by 774
Self-citationExplaining the evidence: Tests of the Story Model for juror decision making.
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189 · Cited by 761
Exploring Science: The Cognition and Development of Discovery Processes
Klahr, D. (2000) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2939.001.0001 · Cited by 325
Cited by
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Langer, M., Oster, D., Speith, T., Hermanns, H., Kästner, L., Schmidt, E., Sesing, A., & Baum, K. (2021) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103473 · Cited by 652
The Development of Argument Skills
Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00605 · Cited by 595
Self-citationCommunicating uncertainty about facts, numbers and science
van der Bles, A. M., van der Linden, S., Freeman, A. L. J., Mitchell, J., Galvao, A. B., Zaval, L., & Spiegelhalter, D. J. (2019) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.181870 · Cited by 456
Promoting Argument-Counterargument Integration in Students' Writing
Nussbaum, E. M., & Schraw, G. (2007) · The Journal of Experimental Education · doi:10.3200/jexe.76.1.59-92 · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Authors
- Kuhn, D.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2001-01
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-8
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2163001257
- Cited by
- 369
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 19.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
