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Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games

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Koller, Daphne, Megiddo, Nimrod, von Stengel, Bernhard·1996·Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

The Nash equilibria of a two-person, non-zero-sum game are the solutions of a certain linear complementarity problem (LCP). In order to use this for solving a game in extensive form, the game must first be converted to a strategic description such as the normal form. The classical normal form, however, is often exponentially large in the size of the game tree. If the game has perfect recall, a linear-sized strategic description is the sequence form. For the resulting small LCP, we show that an equilibrium is found efficiently by Lemke's algorithm, a generalization of the Lemke–Howson method.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.

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Metadata

Authors
Koller, D., Megiddo, N., & von Stengel, B.
Venue
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1996-06
Volume
14
Issue
2
Pages
247-259
ISSN
0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2086386133
Cited by
228
References
0
FWCI
5.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1006/game.1996.0051
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Koller, D., Megiddo, N., & von Stengel, B. (1996). Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0051

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