The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
Open accessAbstract
In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always realistic. In many settings, one player is able to commit to a strategy before the other player makes a decision. Such models are synonymously referred to as leadership, commitment, or Stackelberg models, and optimal play in such models is often significantly different from optimal play in the model where strategies are selected simultaneously.The recent surge in interest in computing game-theoretic solutions has so far ignored leadership models (with the exception of the interest in mechanism design, where the designer is implicitly in a leadership position). In this paper, we study how to compute optimal strategies to commit to under both commitment to pure strategies and commitment to mixed strategies, in both normal-form and Bayesian games. We give both positive results (efficient algorithms) and negative results (NP-hardness results).
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Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
Paruchuri, P., Pearce, J. P., Marecki, J., Tambe, M., Ordóñez, F., & Kraus, S. (2008) · doi:10.5555/1402298.1402348 · Cited by 424
Computing Optimal Randomized Resource Allocations for Massive Security Games
Kiekintveld, C., Jain, M., Tsai, J., Pita, J., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M. (2011) · Security and Game Theory · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511973031.008 · Cited by 351
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93
Harrenstein, P., Brandt, F., & Fischer, F. (2007) · Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems · doi:10.1145/1329125.1329157 · Cited by 7
Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents
de Witt, C. S., Krawiecka, K., Krawczuk, I., Hagag, B., Anderson, W. L., Belcak, P., Bucknall, B., Cai, X., Chopra, A., Cohen, D., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.02077 · Cited by 108
“Game theorists have studied security game equilibria (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006), mechanism designers have studied incentive alignment in static settings (Myerson, 1981), and multi-agent learning researchers have studied the end-to-end learning dynamics of neural network policies (Busoniu et al.,…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Conitzer, V., & Sandholm, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2006-06-11
- Pages
- 82-90
- OpenAlex
- W1971309210
- Cited by
- 479
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 9.92
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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