The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Research works printed but not linked: 19
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- Blume, 1996, Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games, Games Econ. Behav., 13, 2, 10.1006/game.1996.0022 · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0022
- Blume, 1998, Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games, Am. Econ. Rev., 88, 1323
- Blume, 1993, Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication, Games Econ. Behav., 5, 547, 10.1006/game.1993.1031 · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1031
- Cho, 1987, Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, Quart. J. Econ., 102, 179, 10.2307/1885060 · DOI · Paper page
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- Forsythe, 1999, Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, J. Finan. Stud., 12, 481, 10.1093/rfs/12.3.481 · doi:10.1093/rfs/12.3.481
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- Newman, 1993, Disclosure Policies with Multiple Users, J. Account. Res., 31, 92, 10.2307/2491043 · DOI · Paper page
- Rabin, 1990, Communication Between Rational Agents, J. Econ. Theory, 51, 144, 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-O · DOI · Paper page
- Rabin, 1996, Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements, J. Econ. Theory, 68, 1, 10.1006/jeth.1996.0001 · DOI
- Roth, 1979, Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Bargaining, Psych. Rev., 86, 574, 10.1037/0033-295X.86.6.574 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.86.6.574 · Paper page
- Stein, 1989, Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements, Amer. Econ. Rev., 79, 32
Cited by
Deception: The Role of Consequences
Gneezy, U. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828662 · Cited by 1,729
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
KARTIK, N. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00559.x · Cited by 607
Wang, J. T.-Y., Spezio, M., & Camerer, C. F. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.984 · Cited by 416
Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions
Crawford, V. P. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455197 · Cited by 391
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
Cai, H., & Wang, J. T.-Y. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001 · Cited by 370
Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior
Gneezy, A., Imas, A., Brown, A., Nelson, L. D., & Norton, M. I. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1437 · Cited by 337
Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
Duffy, S., Hartwig, T., & Smith, J. (2014) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-013-9380-5 · Cited by 7
Ouimet, M., Lalancette, P., & Racine, A. (2017) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0185183 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., & Sprinkle, G. B.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-10
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 79-120
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1991577073
- Cited by
- 207
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.