The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results
Abstract
We report experimental results on the role of preplay communication in a one-shot, symmetric battle of the sexes game. We conducted games in which there was no communication, and we studied the effects of three different communication structures: one-way communication with one round of messages and two-way communication with one round as well as three rounds of messages. With these messages, each player could indicate which action he planned to take. Communication significantly increased the frequency of equilibrium play. One-way communication was most effective in resolving the coordination problem. While there was more conflict with two-way communication, one round of communication helped to overcome some of the coordination problems, and three rounds of communication performed even better.
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Cites
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555589 · Cited by 2,597
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Pearce, D. G. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911197 · Cited by 1,407
Communication in Coordination Games
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118488 · Cited by 687
Self-citationCheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry
Farrell, J. (1987) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555533 · Cited by 511
Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results
Cooper, R. (1990) · American Economic Review · Cited by 421
Self-citationTwo-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas.
Lieberman, B., & Rapoport, A. (1967) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091730 · Cited by 232
Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange
Berg, J. E., Daley, L. A., Dickhaut, J. W., & O'Brien, J. R. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1891116 · Cited by 178
Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
Myerson, R. B. (1989) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0 · Cited by 70
Cited by
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Chen, Y., & Li, S. X. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.431 · Cited by 1,536
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992
SALLY, D. (1995) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463195007001004 · Cited by 1,126
Farrell, J., & Rabin, M. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.3.103 · Cited by 1,012
Individual Behavior and Group Membership
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., & Rustichini, A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1340 · Cited by 663
Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1998) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1023/a:1009905800005 · Cited by 656
Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 568
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2034184326
- Cited by
- 369
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 9.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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