Shapley Value
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Abstract
The value of an uncertain outcome (a ‘gamble’, ‘lottery’, etc.) to a participant is an evaluation, in the participant’s utility scale, of the prospective outcomes: It is an a priori measure of what he expects to obtain (this is the subject of ‘utility theory’). In a similar way, one is interested in evaluating a game ; that is, measuring the value of each player in the game. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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“Specifically, we use the Shapley value (Shapley 1952; Hart 1989; Cohen, Dror, and Ruppin 2007; Lundberg and Lee 2017; Ghorbani and Zou 2019), a mathematically rigorous method to quantify both individual component contributions and their interaction effects across all possible component configurations.”
From Understanding and Optimizing Agentic Workflows via Shapley value (2025) · cites this paper as Hart 1989
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Citations
Cites
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Myerson, R. B. (1977) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225 · Cited by 1,446
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Cited by
Fuel properties of hydrochar and pyrochar: Prediction and exploration with machine learning
Li, J., Pan, L., Suvarna, M., Tong, Y. W., & Wang, X. (2020) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.115166 · Cited by 316
Understanding and Optimizing Agentic Workflows via Shapley value
Yang, Y., Huang, B., Qi, S., Feng, C., Hu, H., Zhu, Y., Hu, J., Zhao, H., He, Z., Liu, X., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.00510 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, S.
- Venue
- Game Theory
- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Published
- 1989
- Pages
- 210-216
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 2
- Language
- en
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