Conditions of Personhood
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I am a person, and so are you. That much is beyond doubt. I am a human being, and probably you are too. If you take offense at the “probably” you stand accused of a sort of racism, for what is important about us is not that we are of the same biological species, but that we are both persons, and I have not cast doubt on that. One’s dignity does not depend on one’s parentage even to the extent of having been born of women or born at all. We normally ignore this and treat humanity as the deciding mark of personhood, no doubt because the terms are locally coextensive or almost coextensive. At this time and place human beings are the only persons we recognize, and we recognize almost all human beings as persons, but on the one hand we can easily contemplate the existence of biologically very different persons—inhabiting other planets, perhaps—and on the other hand we recognize conditions that exempt human beings from personhood, or at least some very important elements of personhood. For instance, infant human beings, mentally defective human beings, and human beings declared insane by licensed psychiatrists are denied personhood, or at any rate crucial elements of personhood. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Citations
Cites
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024717 · Cited by 4,663
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dennett, D.
- Venue
- What Is a Person?
- Publisher
- Humana Press
- Published
- 1988
- Pages
- 145-167
- OpenAlex
- W1482902010
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 55.04
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Dennett, D. (1988). Conditions of Personhood. What Is a Person? https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-3950-5_7
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