Non-invasive Spoofing Attacks for Anti-lock Braking Systems
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Sensor data can be spoofed, tampered with, and thus poisoned.
“Sensor data can be spoofed [65,66], tampered with, and thus poisoned.”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [66]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey
Humayed, A., Lin, J., Li, F., & Luo, B. (2017) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172 · Cited by 1,185 · see citing works
Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges
Chen, Y., & Esmaeilzadeh, P. (2024) · Journal of Medical Internet Research · doi:10.2196/53008 · Cited by 353 · see citing works
“Sensor data can be spoofed [65,66], tampered with, and thus poisoned.”
Stealthy Attacks against Robotic Vehicles Protected by Control-based Intrusion Detection Techniques
Dash, P., Karimibiuki, M., & Pattabiraman, K. (2021) · Digital Threats: Research and Practice · doi:10.1145/3419474 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
- Authors
- Shoukry, Y., Martin, P., Tabuada, P., & Srivastava, M.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Published
- 2013
- Pages
- 55-72
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W185142374
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 5.38
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Keywords
- anti-lock braking system, physical layer attacks, sensor spoofing, wheel speed sensors, electromagnetic interference, magnetic sensors, automotive cybersecurity, non-invasive attacks, attack detection evasion, vehicle safety
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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