A Practical Cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present a novel cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser primitive. This key agreement scheme, based on techniques from permutation groups, matrix groups and braid groups, is proposed as an underlying technology for ISO/IEC 29167-20, which is intended for authentication of RFID tags. SecureRF, the company owning the trademark Algebraic Eraser, markets it as suitable in general for lightweight environments such as RFID tags and other IoT applications. Our attack is practical on standard hardware: for parameter sizes corresponding to claimed 128-bit security, our implementation recovers the shared key using less than 8 CPU hours, and less than 64i¾?MB of memory.
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“Besides this, the vulnerabilities of [113] are indicated in [114].”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [114]
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Cites
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
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A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1983) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/357980.358017 · Cited by 13,012
The Magma Algebra System I: The User Language
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Polynomial-Time Solutions of Computational Problems in Noncommutative-Algebraic Cryptography
Tsaban, B. (2013) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/s00145-013-9170-9 · Cited by 85
Self-citationCryptanalysis via Algebraic Spans
Ben-Zvi, A., Kalka, A., & Tsaban, B. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_9 · Cited by 48
Self-citationShort expressions of permutations as products and cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser
Kalka, A., Teicher, M., & Tsaban, B. (2012) · Advances in Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/j.aam.2012.03.001 · Cited by 23
Self-citationKey agreement, the Algebraic Eraser^{𝑇𝑀}, and lightweight cryptography
Anshel, I., Anshel, M., Goldfeld, D., & Lemieux, S. (2006) · Contemporary Mathematics · doi:10.1090/conm/418/07943 · Cited by 17
Cryptanalysis of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld-Lemieux Key Agreement Protocol
Myasnikov, A. D., & Ushakov, A. (2009) · journal of Groups complexity cryptology · doi:10.1515/gcc.2009.63 · Cited by 15
On the Security of the Algebraic Eraser Tag Authentication Protocol
Blackburn⋆, S. R., & Robshaw, M. J. B. (2016) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_1 · Cited by 14
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Atkins, D., Gunnells, P.: Algebraic Eraser™: a lightweight, efficient asymmetric key agreement protocol for use in no-power, low-power, and IoT devices. In: NIST Lightweight Cryptography Workshop, 20 July 2015. http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/lwc_workshop2015.cfm
Cited by
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey
Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3174679 · Cited by 406
“Besides this, the vulnerabilities of [113] are indicated in [114].”
BackgroundTahir, M., Sardaraz, M., Muhammad, S., & Khan, M. S. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12176960 · Cited by 130
Cryptanalysis via Algebraic Spans
Ben-Zvi, A., Kalka, A., & Tsaban, B. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_9 · Cited by 48
Self-citationLiu, D., Li, N., Kim, J., & Nepal, . (2017) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 19
On the Security of the Algebraic Eraser Tag Authentication Protocol
Blackburn⋆, S. R., & Robshaw, M. J. B. (2016) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_1 · Cited by 14
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ben-Zvi, A., Blackburn, S. R., & Tsaban, B.
- Affiliations
- Bar-Ilan University (IL)
- ORCID
- Tsaban, Boaz
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Published
- 2016
- Pages
- 179-189
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W2254391108
- Cited by
- 15
- References
- 13
- Citations by year
- 2022: 1 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 1.44
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
- Keywords
- cryptanalysis, key exchange, braid groups, linear groups, permutation groups, RFID authentication, lightweight cryptography
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- Ben-Zvi, A., Blackburn, S. R., & Tsaban, B. (2016). A Practical Cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_7
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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