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A Practical Cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser

Ben-Zvi, Adi, Blackburn, Simon R., Tsaban, Boaz · 2016 · Lecture Notes in Computer Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We present a novel cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser primitive. This key agreement scheme, based on techniques from permutation groups, matrix groups and braid groups, is proposed as an underlying technology for ISO/IEC 29167-20, which is intended for authentication of RFID tags. SecureRF, the company owning the trademark Algebraic Eraser, markets it as suitable in general for lightweight environments such as RFID tags and other IoT applications. Our attack is practical on standard hardware: for parameter sizes corresponding to claimed 128-bit security, our implementation recovers the shared key using less than 8 CPU hours, and less than 64i¾?MB of memory.

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  1. Atkins, D., Gunnells, P.: Algebraic Eraser™: a lightweight, efficient asymmetric key agreement protocol for use in no-power, low-power, and IoT devices. In: NIST Lightweight Cryptography Workshop, 20 July 2015. http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/lwc_workshop2015.cfm

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Metadata

Authors
Ben-Zvi, A., Blackburn, S. R., & Tsaban, B.
Affiliations
Bar-Ilan University (IL)
Venue
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Published
2016
Pages
179-189
ISSN
  • 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
  • 1611-3349
OpenAlex
W2254391108
Cited by
15
References
13
Citations by year
2022: 1 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
FWCI
1.44
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
Keywords
cryptanalysis, key exchange, braid groups, linear groups, permutation groups, RFID authentication, lightweight cryptography

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Practical Cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_7
The paper
Ben-Zvi, A., Blackburn, S. R., & Tsaban, B. (2016). A Practical Cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_7

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