The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Anatomy of a financial crisis
Open accessAbstract
This paper provides an asymmetric information framework for understanding the nature of financial crises.It provides the following precise definition of a financial crisis: A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities.As a result, a financial crisis can drive the economy away from an equilibrium with high output in which financial markets perform well to one in which output declines sharply.The asymmetric information framework explains the patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain.It indicates that financial crises have effects over and above those resulting from bank panics and therefore provides a rationale for an expanded lender-of-last resort role for the central bank in which the central bank uses the discount window to provide liquidity to sectors outside of the banking system.
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Cites
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Cited by
Economic policy uncertainty and financial stability–Is there a relation?
Phan, D. H. B., Iyke, B. N., Sharma, S. S., & Affandi, Y. (2021) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2020.02.042 · Cited by 367
Modelling central bank behaviour in Nigeria:A Markov-switching approach
Ayinde, T. O., Bankole, A. S., & Adeniyi, O. (2020) · Central Bank Review · doi:10.1016/j.cbrev.2020.11.001 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Mishkin, F. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Evolutionary Economics
- Published
- 1992-06
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 115-130
- ISSN
- 0936-9937 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1386
- OpenAlex
- W2026645280
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 3.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.