The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The all-pay auction with complete information
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Cites
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Cited by
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
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The Economic Design of Sporting Contests
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
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Luong, N. C., Hoang, D. T., Wang, P., Niyato, D., Kim, D. I., & Han, Z. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2582841 · Cited by 357
Metadata
- Authors
- Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G.
- Venue
- Economic Theory
- Published
- 1996-06
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 291-305
- ISSN
- 0938-2259 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0479
- OpenAlex
- W3049570326
- Cited by
- 812
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 9.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.