The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
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Citations
Cites
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
Loasby, B. J., Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1983) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232409 · Cited by 21,366
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change
Berkowitz, M. K., Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1983) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1058233 · Cited by 10,549
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Culture and the Evolutionary Process
Griesemer, J. R., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1986) · The Condor · doi:10.2307/1367778 · Cited by 7,034
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,922
SMITH, J. M., & PRICE, G. R. (1973) · Nature · doi:10.1038/246015a0 · Cited by 5,089
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159 · Cited by 2,147
Cultural transmission and evolution: A quantitative approach
Harrison, G. A. (1982) · Endeavour · doi:10.1016/0160-9327(82)90036-9 · Cited by 2,059
Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A quantitative approach
Ballonoff, P. (1985) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(85)90017-4 · Cited by 1,691
Cited by
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203194 · Cited by 784
Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00131-1 · Cited by 554
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A., & Gächter, S. (1998) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209891 · Cited by 437
Metadata
- Authors
- G�th, W.
- Venue
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Published
- 1995-12
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 323-344
- ISSN
- 0020-7276 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1270
- OpenAlex
- W1992623025
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 16.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/bf01243036
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- G�th, W. (1995). An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives. International Journal of Game Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243036
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
