On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
High-stakes experiments, such as those conducted by Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996), have not produced substantively different behavior than those with lower stakes.
“Third,”
From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996)
Cites
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674 · see citing works
Self-citation
Flagged first, then by citations
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“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898 · see citing works
Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.11.1.109 · Cited by 1,071 · see citing works
Economic games on the internet: the effect of $1 stakes
Amir, O., Rand, D. G., & Gal, Y. K. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031461 · Cited by 364 · see citing works
- Authors
- Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L.
- Affiliations
- Iowa State University (US)
- University of Minnesota (US)
- University of Arizona (US)
- Venue
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Published
- 1996-09
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 289-301
- ISSN
- 0020-7276 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1270
- OpenAlex
- W2053398173
- Cited by
- 356
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 16
- FWCI
- 23.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Journal of Game Theory (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- ultimatum game, bargaining, acceptance of offer, rejection behavior, institutional environment, experimental economics
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