The reappearing tool: transparency, smart technology, and the extended mind
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Some thinkers have claimed that expert performance with technology is characterized by a kind of disappearance of that technology from conscious experience, that is, by the transparency of the tools and equipment through which we sense and manipulate the world. This is a claim that may be traced to phenomenological philosophers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but it has been influential in user interface design where the transparency of technology has often been adopted as a mark of good design. Moreover, in the philosophy of cognitive science, such transparency has been advanced as necessary for extended cognition (the situation in which the technology with which we couple genuinely counts as a constitutive part of our cognitive machinery, along with our brains). By reflecting on concrete examples of our contemporary engagement with technology, I shall argue that the epistemic challenges posed by smart artefacts (those that come equipped with artificial-intelligence-based applications) should prompt a reassessment of the drive for transparency in the design of some cases of technology-involving cognition. This has consequences for the place of extended minds in the contemporary technological context.
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“But the intuition that more transparency equals more integration (in this sense of clear authorship of behaviour) starts to break down when we consider AI-powered technologies [Clowes, 2020, Wheeler, 2019].”
From Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things (2025) · cites this paper as Wheeler, 2019
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Cited by
How does HCI Understand Human Agency and Autonomy?
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“When we hear calls for transparency in corporate or governmental processes, these seem to concern the acquisition of greater knowledge of, or insight into, the reasons and processes that lead to 12 Wheeler (2019) identifies the problem in the following quote: “Sometimes, technology is described as being transparent wh…”
A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness
Heersmink, R., de Rooij, B., Clavel Vázquez, M. J., & Colombo, M. (2024) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-024-09777-3 · Cited by 91
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Varieties of Artifacts: Embodied, Perceptual, Cognitive, and Affective
Heersmink, R. (2021) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12549 · Cited by 93
Embodiment in online psychotherapy: A qualitative study
García, E., Paolo, E. A. D., & Jaegher, H. D. (2021) · Psychology and Psychotherapy Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1111/papt.12359 · Cited by 93
Metadata
- Authors
- Wheeler, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Wheeler, Michael
- ORCID
- Wheeler, Michael
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2018-02-07
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 857-866
- ISSN
- 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-5655
- OpenAlex
- W2767493263
- Cited by
- 67
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 2.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- Locations
- AI & Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Stirling Online Research Repository (University of Stirling) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Microsoft Research
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/L009684/1)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Communication › Digital Media and Philosophy
- Keywords
- extended mind, extended cognition, artificial intelligence, user interface design, Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology of technology
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