In Defense of Extended Functionalism
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter aims to clarify the relationship between the extended cognition hypothesis (ExC) and functionalism, and to defend extended functionalism against three of its strongest criticisms. ExC claims that there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts are spatially distributed over the brain, body, and world in such a way that the external factors concerned are rightly accorded cognitive status. It is concerned mainly with the whereabouts of thinking and thoughts that is separate not only from the position adopted by orthodox cognitive science, but also from the position adopted by any embodied-embedded account of mind. Adams and Aizawa have repeatedly emphasized the insufficiency of thoughts being spatially distributed over brain, body, and world solely in the sense that applies when some instance of intelligent behavior is discovered to be causally dependent on the bodily exploitation of certain external props. The chapter concludes with a brief remark on extended functionalism and phenomenal consciousness.
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Cites
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“For of course involves external factors, when in all other relevant respects it is equivalent.”
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On the proper treatment of connectionism
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PUTNAM, H. (1967) · Art, Mind, and Religion · doi:10.2307/jj.6380610.6 · Cited by 778
Cited by
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
Rupert, R. D. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001 · Cited by 411
Embodiment and sense-making in autism
De Jaegher, H. (2013) · Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnint.2013.00015 · Cited by 388
The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering
Sutton, J., Harris, C. B., Keil, P. G., & Barnier, A. J. (2010) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9182-y · Cited by 377
Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition
Menary, R. (2010) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9187-6 · Cited by 338
Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems
Heersmink, R. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9355-1 · Cited by 191
Metadata
- Authors
- Wheeler, M.
- Venue
- The Extended Mind
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2010-05-21
- Pages
- 244-270
- OpenAlex
- W2158906984
- Cited by
- 116
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 24.19
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Wheeler, M. (2010). In Defense of Extended Functionalism. The Extended Mind. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0011
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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