The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 34 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence
Open accessAbstract
Most accounts of responsibility focus on one type of responsibility, moral responsibility, or address one particular aspect of moral responsibility such as agency. This article outlines a broader framework to think about responsibility that includes causal responsibility, relational responsibility, and what I call “narrative responsibility” as a form of “hermeneutic responsibility”, connects these notions of responsibility with different kinds of knowledge, disciplines, and perspectives on human being, and shows how this framework is helpful for mapping and analysing how artificial intelligence (AI) challenges human responsibility and sense-making in various ways. Mobilizing recent hermeneutic approaches to technology, the article argues that next to, and interwoven with, other types of responsibility such as moral responsibility, we also have narrative and hermeneutic responsibility—in general and for technology. For example, it is our task as humans to make sense of, with and, if necessary, against AI. While from a posthumanist point of view, technologies also contribute to sense-making, humans are the experiencers and bearers of responsibility and always remain in charge when it comes to this hermeneutic responsibility. Facing and working with a world of data, correlations, and probabilities, we are nevertheless condemned to make sense. Moreover, this also has a normative, sometimes even political aspect: acknowledging and embracing our hermeneutic responsibility is important if we want to avoid that our stories are written elsewhere—through technology.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This conceptual article broadens responsibility beyond moral responsibility to include causal, relational, and narrative/hermeneutic responsibility, and argues AI challenges each. It concludes that although AI participates in meaning-making, humans remain the necessary meaning-makers and bear narrative responsibility to make sense of, with, or against AI.
Key findings
- The paper distinguishes causal responsibility, moral responsibility, relational responsibility, and “narrative responsibility” as a form of “hermeneutic responsibility”; moral responsibility implies relational responsibility, and moral and narrative responsibility need one another.
- AI challenges causal and moral responsibility because machine learning produces correlations and probabilities rather than causal explanations, and deep learning can be opaque, creating ignorance on the part of users.
- AI is not merely an object of stories: it can co-configure narratives and participate in meaning-making (e.g., health monitoring, smart calendars, GPT-3 text generation), but because it lacks consciousness, subjectivity, and experience, it cannot complete the hermeneutic process.
- Humans have hermeneutic/narrative responsibility: they must make sense of AI and decide what narratives to co-write; failing this risks living in stories written by others (e.g., big tech, governments) and falling into hermeneutic ignorance or passive nihilism.
Methods
- Design: conceptual/philosophical analysis, not an empirical study; develops a framework of responsibility types and applies it to AI.
- Data or sample: no empirical sample or dataset; draws on philosophical and interdisciplinary literature (Aristotle, Ricoeur, Wittgenstein, Levinas, Duff, postphenomenology, STS, etc.).
- Main analysis: analytic distinction and argumentation, including hermeneutic and narrative theory, to map how AI challenges responsibility and sense-making.
Limitations
- Paper states: more work is needed on the existential dimension of hermeneutic responsibility and on the existential dimension of our relation to digital technologies/AI; a full discussion of relations among responsibility types is beyond scope.
- Paper states: the question of which narrative to create goes beyond the paper’s scope.
- Evident from text: no empirical data, sample, or formal testing; arguments are conceptual and normative, so claims are not empirically validated in this article.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
4 Valid · 3 Not valid · 24 Not checked · 171 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“if AI gives us a recommendation and we make a decision based on this recommendation, but the AI process does not enable us to explain to those affected by the decision why a particular decision was made in their case, then we cannot fulfil our relational responsibility (Coeckelbergh 2020).”
§ Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence How AI challenges human responsibility and sense-making > 3 From minds to social relations: relational responsibility to others
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Coeckelbergh 2020 source
In “Include Responsibility Patients, or Responsibility as Answerability,” the paper says that a person who decides on an AI recommendation but cannot explain the decision fails to act responsibly toward those affected, who can rightfully demand an explanation. This directly supports the citing sentence’s account of relational responsibility. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“causal responsibility does not necessarily entail moral responsibility.”
§ Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence How AI challenges human responsibility and sense-making > 2 Causal responsibility and moral responsibility in trouble: the battle for the mind
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, these conditions are not always fulfilled when technologies such as AI take over human tasks.”
§ Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence How AI challenges human responsibility and sense-making > 1 Introduction
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“AI threatens such views of human being, morality, and responsibility.”
§ Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence How AI challenges human responsibility and sense-making > 1 Introduction
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“AI is the new technology to”
§ Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence How AI challenges human responsibility and sense-making > 2 Causal responsibility and moral responsibility in trouble: the battle for the mind
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
18 more claims
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 158
- It may state two separate claims as one. 80
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“This trend is particularly evident in content creative industries, which are entering a new phase of transformation where generative AI is changing the nature of job roles, skill requirements and skill value (Cetinic & She, 2022; Coeckelbergh, 2023).”
From If ChatGPT can do it, where is my creativity? generative AI boosts performance but diminishes experience in creative writing (2025) · cites this paper as Coeckelbergh, 2023
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Citations
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Cited by
Implementing AI in healthcare—the relevance of trust: a scoping review
Steerling, E., Siira, E., Nilsén, P., Svedberg, P., & Nygren, J. (2023) · Frontiers in Health Services · doi:10.3389/frhs.2023.1211150 · Cited by 158
“This could be explained by our ability to contextualize information through narratives (58), which is also in line with Luhmann (11) who viewed trust as possible only in a familiar world.”
BackgroundGenerative AI and the politics of visibility
Gillespie, T. (2024) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/20539517241252131 · Cited by 122
The mechanisms of AI hype and its planetary and social costs
Markelius, A., Wright, C., Kuiper, J., Delille, N., & Kuo, Y.-T. (2024) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-024-00461-2 · Cited by 143
Expert views about missing AI narratives: is there an AI story crisis?
Chubb, J., Reed, D., & Cowling, P. (2022) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-022-01548-2 · Cited by 102
“This is supported by a growing body of research into the critical value of AI narratives (Kim 2022; Coeckelbergh 2021).”
BackgroundInfluentialMaiti, M., Kayal, P., & Vujko, A. (2025) · Future Business Journal · doi:10.1186/s43093-025-00462-5 · Cited by 126
Metadata
- Authors
- Coeckelbergh, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Vienna (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Coeckelbergh, Mark
- ORCID
- Coeckelbergh, Mark
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2021-12-30
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2437-2450
- ISSN
- 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-5655
- OpenAlex
- W4200293778
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 4
- FWCI
- 8.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- AI & Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- University of Vienna
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Keywords
- artificial intelligence, moral responsibility, causal responsibility, relational responsibility, sensemaking, posthumanism, human agency
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