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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 34 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence

Open access
Coeckelbergh, Mark · 2023 · AI & SOCIETY

Abstract

Most accounts of responsibility focus on one type of responsibility, moral responsibility, or address one particular aspect of moral responsibility such as agency. This article outlines a broader framework to think about responsibility that includes causal responsibility, relational responsibility, and what I call “narrative responsibility” as a form of “hermeneutic responsibility”, connects these notions of responsibility with different kinds of knowledge, disciplines, and perspectives on human being, and shows how this framework is helpful for mapping and analysing how artificial intelligence (AI) challenges human responsibility and sense-making in various ways. Mobilizing recent hermeneutic approaches to technology, the article argues that next to, and interwoven with, other types of responsibility such as moral responsibility, we also have narrative and hermeneutic responsibility—in general and for technology. For example, it is our task as humans to make sense of, with and, if necessary, against AI. While from a posthumanist point of view, technologies also contribute to sense-making, humans are the experiencers and bearers of responsibility and always remain in charge when it comes to this hermeneutic responsibility. Facing and working with a world of data, correlations, and probabilities, we are nevertheless condemned to make sense. Moreover, this also has a normative, sometimes even political aspect: acknowledging and embracing our hermeneutic responsibility is important if we want to avoid that our stories are written elsewhere—through technology.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This conceptual article broadens responsibility beyond moral responsibility to include causal, relational, and narrative/hermeneutic responsibility, and argues AI challenges each. It concludes that although AI participates in meaning-making, humans remain the necessary meaning-makers and bear narrative responsibility to make sense of, with, or against AI.

Key findings

  • The paper distinguishes causal responsibility, moral responsibility, relational responsibility, and “narrative responsibility” as a form of “hermeneutic responsibility”; moral responsibility implies relational responsibility, and moral and narrative responsibility need one another.
  • AI challenges causal and moral responsibility because machine learning produces correlations and probabilities rather than causal explanations, and deep learning can be opaque, creating ignorance on the part of users.
  • AI is not merely an object of stories: it can co-configure narratives and participate in meaning-making (e.g., health monitoring, smart calendars, GPT-3 text generation), but because it lacks consciousness, subjectivity, and experience, it cannot complete the hermeneutic process.
  • Humans have hermeneutic/narrative responsibility: they must make sense of AI and decide what narratives to co-write; failing this risks living in stories written by others (e.g., big tech, governments) and falling into hermeneutic ignorance or passive nihilism.

Methods

  • Design: conceptual/philosophical analysis, not an empirical study; develops a framework of responsibility types and applies it to AI.
  • Data or sample: no empirical sample or dataset; draws on philosophical and interdisciplinary literature (Aristotle, Ricoeur, Wittgenstein, Levinas, Duff, postphenomenology, STS, etc.).
  • Main analysis: analytic distinction and argumentation, including hermeneutic and narrative theory, to map how AI challenges responsibility and sense-making.

Limitations

  • Paper states: more work is needed on the existential dimension of hermeneutic responsibility and on the existential dimension of our relation to digital technologies/AI; a full discussion of relations among responsibility types is beyond scope.
  • Paper states: the question of which narrative to create goes beyond the paper’s scope.
  • Evident from text: no empirical data, sample, or formal testing; arguments are conceptual and normative, so claims are not empirically validated in this article.

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Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1007/s00146-021-01375-x

Cites

48 of 48 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Bartoletti I (2020) An artificial revolution: on power, politics and AI. The Indigo Press, London
  2. Berlin I (1997) Two concepts of liberty. In: Berlin I (ed) The proper study of mankind. Chatto & Windus, London, pp 191–242
  3. Bijker WE, Hughes TP, Pinch T (eds) (1987) The social construction of technological systems: new directions in the sociology and history of technology. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
  4. Dostoyevsky F (1972) Notes from underground (trans. Coulson J). Penguin Books, London
  5. Duff RA (2005) Who is responsible, for what, to whom? Ohio State J Crim Law 2:441–461
  6. Harari YN (2015) Homo Deus. Vintage, London
  7. Heney C, Banks W, Zimbardo P (1973) Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison. Int J Criminol Penol 1:69–97
  8. Rosenberger R, Verbeek P-P (eds) (2015) Postphenomenological investigations: essays on human-technology relations. Lexington Books, London
  9. van Inwagen P (1983) An essay on free will. Oxford University Press, New York
  10. Winner L (1980) Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus 109(1):121–136
  11. Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical investigations (revised 4th edn, Anscombe GEM, Hacker PMS, Schulte J, trans.). Wiley, Malden, MA
  12. Yeung K (2018) A study of the implications of advanced digital technologies (including AI systems) for the concept of responsibility within a human rights framework. Retrieved on April 12, 2021 from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3286027

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Metadata

Authors
Coeckelbergh, M.
Affiliations
University of Vienna (AT)
Corresponding author
Coeckelbergh, Mark
Venue
AI & SOCIETY
Published
2021-12-30
Volume
38
Issue
6
Pages
2437-2450
ISSN
  • 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
  • 1435-5655
OpenAlex
W4200293778
Cited by
81
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 31 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 4
FWCI
8.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
AI & Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
University of Vienna
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
Keywords
artificial intelligence, moral responsibility, causal responsibility, relational responsibility, sensemaking, posthumanism, human agency

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s00146-021-01375-x
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Coeckelbergh, M. (2023). Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence. AI & SOCIETY. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01375-x

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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