The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Living without Free Will
Abstract
Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living Without Free Will. Pereboom argues that our best scientific theories have the consequence that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform, and that because of this, we are not morally responsible for any of them. He seeks to defend the view that morality, meaning and value remain intact even if we are not morally responsible, and furthermore, that adopting this perspective would provide significant benefit for our lives.
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Cites
Kane, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 · Cited by 1,316
Moral responsibility and leeway for action
Wyma, K. D. (1997) · American Philosophical Quarterly · Cited by 163
James, W. (2006) · Longmans, Green and Co eBooks · doi:10.1037/11061-005 · Cited by 137
Cited by
Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account
Santoni de Sio, F., & van den Hoven, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2018.00015 · Cited by 566
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Mele, A. R. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195305043.001.0001 · Cited by 493
Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them
Santoni de Sio, F., & Mecacci, G. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x · Cited by 490
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism
Fara, M. (2008) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzn078 · Cited by 375
Metadata
- Authors
- Pereboom, D.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2001-02-19
- OpenAlex
- W1541703906
- Cited by
- 1,519
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 7.12
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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