The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many researchers and intellectuals warn about extreme risks from artificial intelligence. However, these warnings typically came without systematic arguments in support. This paper provides an argument that AI will lead to the permanent disempowerment of humanity, e.g. human extinction, by 2100. It rests on four substantive premises which it motivates and defends: first, the speed of advances in AI capability, as well as the capability level current systems have already reached, suggest that it is practically possible to build AI systems capable of disempowering humanity by 2100. Second, due to incentives and coordination problems, if it is possible to build such AI, it will be built. Third, since it appears to be a hard technical problem to build AI which is aligned with the goals of its designers, and many actors might build powerful AI, misaligned powerful AI will be built. Fourth, because disempowering humanity is useful for a large range of misaligned goals, such AI will try to disempower humanity. If AI is capable of disempowering humanity and tries to disempower humanity by 2100, then humanity will be disempowered by 2100. This conclusion has immense moral and prudential significance.
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Cites
Language Models are Few-Shot Learners
Brown, T. B., Mann, B., Ryder, N., Subbiah, M., Kaplan, J., Dhariwal, P., Neelakantan, A., Shyam, P., Sastry, G., Askell, A., et al. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2005.14165 · Cited by 23,372
Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models
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“…It has been shown that language model performance improves smoothly as the scale of the model increases, where performance has a power–law relationship with each individual factor (model size, size of the training dataset or compute) when not bot-tlenecked by the other two (Kaplan et al. 2020).”
QLoRA: Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMs
Dettmers, T., Pagnoni, A., Holtzman, A., & Zettlemoyer, L. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2305.14314 · Cited by 3,832
Building machines that learn and think like people
Lake, B. M., Ullman, T. D., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2017) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x16001837 · Cited by 2,550
Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People
Lake, B. M., Ullman, T. D., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1604.00289 · Cited by 2,550
Sparks of Artificial General Intelligence: Early experiments with GPT-4
Bubeck, S., Chandrasekaran, V., Eldan, R., Gehrke, J., Horvitz, E., Kamar, E., Lee, P., Lee, Y. T., Li, Y., Lundberg, S., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2303.12712 · Cited by 1,526
Emergent Abilities of Large Language Models
Wei, J., Tay, Y., Bommasani, R., Raffel, C., Zoph, B., Borgeaud, S., Yogatama, D., Bosma, M., Zhou, D., Metzler, D., et al. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2206.07682 · Cited by 1,264
Tree of Thoughts: Deliberate Problem Solving with Large Language Models
Yao, S., Yu, D., Zhao, J., Shafran, I., Griffiths, T. L., Cao, Y., & Narasimhan, K. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2305.10601 · Cited by 1,158
Climbing towards NLU: On Meaning, Form, and Understanding in the Age of Data
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“The canonical answer in the literature is the instrumental convergence thesis (Bostrom 2012, 2014).”
Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment
Gabriel, I. (2020) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-020-09539-2 · Cited by 896 · cited 1×
“The underlying rationale is that many, or all, misaligned AI models capable of disempowering humanity will have the goal of disempowering humanity.”
Cited by
Mapping the ethics of generative AI: a comprehensive scoping review
Hagendorff, T. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09694-w · Cited by 141
Understanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
Self-citationAnthis, J. R., Pauketat, J. V. T., Ladak, A., & Manoli, A. (2025) · Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3706598.3713329 · Cited by 24
“…fail to prepare for these new forms of human-AI interaction, we could face “disempowerment,” absent-mindedly giving up control to evolutionary or artificial forces [37, 41, 45, 57, 94, 146], and this transition may be particularly difficult to preempt if it is “accumulative” [86] or “gradual” [94].”
Anthis, J. R., Pauketat, J. V. T., Ladak, A., & Manoli, A. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.08867 · Cited by 24
Examining popular arguments against AI existential risk: a philosophical analysis
Swoboda, T., Uuk, R., Lauwaert, L., Rebera, A. P., Oimann, A.-K., Chomanski, B., & Prunkl, C. (2026) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-025-09881-y · Cited by 1
“For one thing, if superintelligent AI does pose existential risks—an issue that the Argument from Human Frailty does not address—humanity likely gets only one chance to get the response right: get it wrong, and disaster is upon us (Bostrom, 2014; Dung, 2024; Ord, 2020).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Dung, L.
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2024-04-14
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1195-1208
- ISSN
- 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-5655
- OpenAlex
- W4394793541
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 10.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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