Understanding Artificial Agency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 75 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has multiple important virtues and is more informative than alternatives. More speculatively, it may help to illuminate two important emerging questions in AI ethics: 1. Can agency contribute to the moral status of non-human beings, and how? 2. When and why might AI systems exhibit power-seeking behaviour and does this pose an existential risk to humanity?
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“Formulating an agency indicator is challenging because accounts of agency vary widely [65].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [65]
Citations
Cites
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Davidson, D. (1963) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023177 · Cited by 2,938 · cited 1×
“As Butlin himself grants, philosophers conceive of intentional action often in a more demanding way (e.g. Davidson 1963; Korsgaard 2008; 2018).”
BackgroundFrontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership
Nussbaum, M. C. (2007) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1c7zftw · Cited by 1,517 · cited 1×
“According to the dominant view, moral status is determined by sentience, i.e. the capacity to undergo pleasant and unpleasant conscious experiences such as joy, pain and fear (Kriegel 2019; Nussbaum 2007; Singer 2011).”
BackgroundList, C., & Pettit, P. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001 · Cited by 1,344
Dennett, D. C. (1991) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2027085 · Cited by 973
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Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies
Mulgan, T. (2015) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqv034 · Cited by 878
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Bourget, 2019, Phenomenal Intentionality
- Dennett, 1987, The Intentional Stance
- Jaworska, 2021, The Grounds of Moral Status
- Luper, 2021, Death
- Schlosser, 2019, Agency
Cited by
Floridi, L. (2025) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-025-00858-9 · Cited by 154
“For example, (Dung, 2024) proposes a five-dimensional framework for understanding Artificial Agency encompassing goal-directedness, autonomy, efficacy, planning, and intentionality.”
Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
Butlin, P., Long, R., Bayne, T., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Chalmers, D., Constant, A., Deane, G., Elmoznino, E., Fleming, S. M., et al. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.10.011 · Cited by 56
The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI
Dung, L. (2025) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-024-01930-2 · Cited by 27
Self-citationInherent and emergent liability issues in LLM-based agentic systems: a principal-agent perspective
Gabison, G. A., & Xian, R. P. (2025) · Proceedings of the 1st Workshop for Research on Agent Language Models (REALM 2025) · doi:10.18653/v1/2025.realm-1.9 · Cited by 19
“PAT requires a clarification of the agency relationship, which remains a hotly debated interdisciplinary topic for LLM-based systems (Shavit et al., 2023; Dai, 2024; Barandiaran and Almen-dros, 2024; Dung, 2024; Perrier and Bennett, 2025; Mattingly and Cibralic, 2025; Butlin, 2025; Das, 2025).”
In ChatGPT they trust: a study of students' perceptions and misuse of ChatGPT in higher education
Yeung, L. K. C., Chow, D. P. L., Wong, P. H., & Lau, S. S. S. (2026) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-025-00855-w · Cited by 16
“When an entity generates responses that appear reasoned or purposeful, it is more likely to be viewed as intentional [18].”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Dung, L.
- Affiliations
- Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Dung, Leonard
- ORCID
- Dung, Leonard
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2024-02-05
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 450-472
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W4391592270
- Cited by
- 69
- References
- 75
- Citations by year
- 2026: 45 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 4
- FWCI
- 28.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Licence
- Locations
- The Philosophical Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- BMBF (033KI216)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Keywords
- artificial agency, goal-directed behavior, autonomy, long-term planning, AI ethics, existential risk, artificial intelligence
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