Connectionism about human agency: responsible AI and the social lifeworld
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Abstract
This paper analyzes responsible human–machine interaction concerning artificial neural networks (ANNs) and large language models (LLMs) by considering the extension of human agency and autonomy by means of artificial intelligence (AI). Thereby, the paper draws on the sociological concept of “interobjectivity,” first introduced by Bruno Latour, and applies it to technologically situated and interconnected agency. Drawing on Don Ihde’s phenomenology of human-technology relations, this interobjective account of AI allows to understand human–machine interaction as embedded in the social lifeworld. Finally, the paper develops a connectionist account of responsible AI, thereby focusing on patterns such as social goals and actions.
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“AI technologies co-shape human agency within these extended and enactive systems, drawing upon insights from phenomenology, enactivism, and connectionism [49,50].”
From 4E cognition and the coevolution of human–AI interaction (2025) · cites this paper as [50]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Noller, J.
- Affiliations
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Noller, Jörg
- ORCID
- Noller, Jörg
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2024-12-13
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 3881-3890
- ISSN
- 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-5655
- OpenAlex
- W4405383473
- Cited by
- 6
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 1
- FWCI
- 2.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- AI & Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (541433337)
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Keywords
- human agency, responsible AI, artificial neural networks, large language models, interobjectivity, Bruno Latour, Don Ihde, human-technology relations, human-machine interaction, connectionism, autonomy, phenomenology of technology
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