Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness.
Open accessIntegrity signals
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Giving in the dictator game is likely driven by fairness norms and not by kindness.
“Giving in the dictator game is likely driven by fairness norms and not by kindness [35].”
From Short-term compassion training increases prosocial behavior in a newly developed prosocial game (2011) · cites this paper as [35]
Cites
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Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market
Kahneman, D. J., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475.019 · Cited by 3,127 · see citing works
Moran, P. A. P., & Kendall, M. G. (1951) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A (General) · doi:10.2307/2980903 · Cited by 2,736 · see citing works
Fairness and the assumptions of economics
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296367 · Cited by 2,463 · see citing works
Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
Forsythe, R. S., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1021 · Cited by 2,383 · see citing works
New directions in equity research.
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. (1973) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0033967 · Cited by 1,649 · see citing works
Kendall, M. G., & Ord, J. K. (1973) · Cited by 1,361 · see citing works
Govindarajulu, Z., Kendall, M. M., & Gibbons, J. D. (1992) · Technometrics · doi:10.2307/1269571 · Cited by 1,140 · see citing works
(1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 695 · see citing works
Hoffman, E. N., & Spitzer, M. L. (1985) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467773 · Cited by 676 · see citing works
Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
Bolton, G. E., & Zwick, R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1026 · Cited by 532 · see citing works
Self-citationNegotiator cognition and rationality: A behavioral decision theory perspective
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1992) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(92)90009-v · Cited by 130 · see citing works
Equity and coalition bargaining in experimental three-person games
Selten, R. (1987) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528316.003 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Incentives in simple bargaining games
Sefton, M. (1992) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/0167-4870(92)90033-4 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Fong, D. Κ. H., & Bolton, G. E. (1997) · Journal of Business and Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.1997.10524711 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Self-citation
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Weinstein, N., & Ryan, R. M. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0016984 · Cited by 1,484 · see citing works
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240 · see citing works
Awe, the small self, and prosocial behavior
Piff, P. K., Dietze, P., Feinberg, M., Stancato, D. M., & Keltner, D. (2015) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspi0000018 · Cited by 1,214 · see citing works
Short-term compassion training increases prosocial behavior in a newly developed prosocial game
Leiberg, S., Klimecki, O., & Singer, T. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017798 · Cited by 442 · see citing works
Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis
Albert, M., Güth, W., Kirchler, E., & Maciejovsky, B. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9131-3 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Self-protection promotes altruism
Chan, E. Y. (2017) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.05.004 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
- Authors
- Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Zwick, R.
- Affiliations
- Pennsylvania State University (US)
- Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HK)
- Venue
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Published
- 1998-08-17
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 269-299
- ISSN
- 0020-7276 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1270
- OpenAlex
- W2067879790
- Cited by
- 480
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 25
- FWCI
- 68.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- International Journal of Game Theory (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- dictator game, donation behavior, fairness, acts of kindness, equal treatment, social rules, self-interested behavior, experimental instructions
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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