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Cited by 1,240Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEconomic Theory and Institutions

Psychological foundations of incentives

Open access
Fehr, Ernst, Falk, Armin·2002·European Economic Review
DOI 10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2
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Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that economics' narrow self-interest model misses powerful non-pecuniary motives—reciprocity, social approval, and task-specific intrinsic motivation—that interact with material incentives and can make incentives backfire. It reviews experimental and field evidence showing that explicit incentives may reduce voluntary cooperation, while reciprocity and social approval can themselves generate strong incentives.

Key findings

  • Explicit incentives can undermine voluntary cooperation: in Fehr and Gächter's gift-exchange experiment, adding a negatively framed fine reduced average effort below the enforceable level of e = 0.4; positively framed bonuses elicited more cooperation than fines but less than no explicit incentive. In Fehr and Rockenbach's trust-game variant, back-transfers as a share of the tripled transfer were 30.3% when the incentive was used, 47.6% when available but not used, and 40.6% when not available.
  • Reciprocity can create material incentives: giving employers a reward/punishment opportunity decreased shirking from 83% to 26% of trades, increased exact provision of desired effort from 14% to 36%, increased overprovision from 3% to 38%, raised average effort from e = 0.37 to e = 0.65, and increased aggregate monetary payoff by 40%. In Fehr, Klein and Schmidt's multitask experiment, the bonus contract was chosen in 81% of cases and average effort was almost identical across tasks, fluctuating around e1 = e2 = 6.
  • Social approval affects behavior and can interact perversely with fines: Rege and Telle found public-good contributions of 34% of endowment in the anonymous baseline and twice as high when contributions were observable. Gneezy and Rustichini's kindergarten fine roughly doubled late pickups from week 7 onward, and late pickups remained roughly twice the baseline after the fine was removed; in their volunteer-collection experiment, letting children keep 1% of donations reduced the amount collected by 36%, and keeping 10% still reduced it by 8%.
  • The psychological literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation is large—Deci, Koestner and Ryan's meta-study covers 128 experiments—but the paper argues its economic relevance has yet to be established. Deci (1971) found treatment subjects spent 50 seconds less on puzzles in phase 3 than phase 1, while control subjects spent 28 seconds more, but the paper notes alternative explanations such as satiation, disappointment, and signaling.

Methods

  • Design: This is a Schumpeter Lecture/review, not a new primary experiment; it synthesizes experimental and field evidence on how reciprocity, social approval, and task-specific intrinsic motivation interact with economic incentives.
  • Data or sample: It draws on prior laboratory experiments (gift exchange, public goods, trust games), field experiments (physicians, kindergarten parents, Israeli high-school volunteers), and a meta-analysis of 128 experiments; populations include students, Costa Rican CEOs, and other subject pools.
  • Main analysis: Narrative and theoretical synthesis comparing treatment effects across studies, with figures reproduced from cited experiments; no new statistical model or original dataset is reported.

Limitations

  • Stated: The arguments about social approval are described as "quite preliminary and speculative," with little known in the area.
  • Stated: The case for the economic relevance of crowding out of intrinsic motivation "has yet to be established"; ambiguities remain about disappointment versus crowding out, signaling effects, satiation, efficiency consequences, and interactions with implicit incentives.
  • Evident from the text: The paper is a lecture/review rather than a systematic meta-analysis for most claims, and it relies on heterogeneous experiments with different designs, populations, and settings; external validity is only partially addressed, for example through the CEO replication.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2

Cites

76 of 76 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 129 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingcitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 9

    If workers have the opportunity to cooperate voluntarily with their employer, wages remain far above the competitive level.

    “while if workers have the opportunity to cooperate voluntarily with their employer, wages remain far above the competitive level.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)

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    • cites Fehr and Falk (1999)

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  • Findingown data
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 9

    There is still a lot of shirking, as indicated by the difference between the desired effort and the actual effort.

    “First, there is still a lot of shirking as indicated by the difference between the desired effort and the actual effort.”
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    • cites Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger 1997

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  • Findingcitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 9

    If the experimenter rules out voluntary cooperation by fixing the effort level exogenously, wages converge to the competitive level.

    “If the experimenter rules out voluntary cooperation by fixing the effort level exogenously, wages converge to the competitive level,”
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    • cites Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)

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    • cites Fehr and Falk (1999)

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  • Findingcitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 9

    Reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation causes downward wage rigidity because lower wages are associated with lower effort and lower profits.

    “These experiments explicitly show that reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation causes downward wage rigidity because lower wages are associated with lower effort and lower profits.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)

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    • cites Fehr and Falk (1999)

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  • Findingcitation
    § 2. RECIPROCITY AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES · p. 7

    Experimental evidence indicates that a substantial fraction of people exhibits social preferences.

    “The experimental evidence indicates that a substantial fraction of the people exhibits social preferences.”
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    • cites Fehr and Schmidt (2001)

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    • cites Sobel (2001)

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  • May combine two claims. 61
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 29
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

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    Findingcitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    Many people increase their contribution to a public good if others also increase their contributions, although, in material terms, each individual has a strict incentive to contribute nothing.

    “It is shown by Croson (2000), Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001), and Falk and Fischbacher (2001) that many people increase their contribution to a public good if others also increase their contributions, although, in material terms, each individual has a strict incentive to contribute nothing.”
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    • cites Croson (2000)

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    • cites Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) source

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    • cites Falk and Fischbacher (2001)

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 13

    Similar results were obtained in the studies of Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001), Benz, Fehr and Frey (2001), Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) and Schulze and Frank (2001).

    “It is also worth emphasizing that similar results were obtained in the studies of Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001), Benz, Fehr and Frey (2001), Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) and Schulze and Frank (2001).”
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    • cites Benz, Fehr and Frey (2001)

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    • cites Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001)

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    Findingcitation
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 13

    In 98.5 percent of all the cases the employers stipulated a fine in the negatively framed treatment and only in 1.5 percent of the cases they set f = 0.

    “In 98.5 percent of all the cases the employers stipulated a fine in this treatment and only in 1.5 percent of the cases they set f = 0.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fehr and Gächter (2000b)

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    Findingown data
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 17

    Total surplus and investors' average payoffs are highest when the incentive is available but not used.

    “The total surplus and the investors' average payoffs are highest when the incentive is available but not used.”
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    Premisenone given
    § Psychological Foundations of Incentives · p. 3

    Economists have constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation.

    “During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

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    Interpretationown data
    § 1. INTRODUCTION · p. 5

    Reciprocity may severely weaken certain economic incentives while at the same time strengthening other kinds of economic incentives.

    “Section 2 provides experimental evidence indicating that reciprocity may severely weaken certain economic incentives while at the same time strengthening other kinds of economic incentives.”
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    Premisenone given
    § 1. INTRODUCTION · p. 5

    Contract theory and principal-agent theory typically restrict their attention to the motives to achieve income through effort and to avoid risks.

    “Contract theory and principal-agent theory, for example, typically restrict their attention to the motives to achieve income through effort and to avoid risks.”
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    Interpretationnone given
    § 1. INTRODUCTION · p. 5

    The economic relevance of the psychological literature on the interaction between extrinsic incentives and task-specific intrinsic motivation has yet to be shown.

    “We argue that, although the results and the claims of this literature are intriguing and interesting, the economic relevance of this literature has yet to be shown.”
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    Interpretationnone given
    § 1. INTRODUCTION · p. 5

    Powerful non-pecuniary motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval shape human behaviour.

    “We will provide evidence suggesting that powerful non-pecuniary motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval, also shape human behaviour.”
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    Premisecitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 9

    Bewley reports that managers claim workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators.

    “Bewley reports that 'managers claim that workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators' (Bewley 1995, p. 252).”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    The existence of conditional cooperation renders the management of the workers' beliefs about the other workers' effort important because if a conditional cooperator believes that the others shirk he will also tend to shirk.

    “The existence of conditional cooperation renders the management of the workers' beliefs about the other workers' effort important because if a conditional cooperator believes that the others shirk he will also tend to shirk.”
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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    Despite this, Milgrom and Roberts' whole book is based on the assumption that people behave as if they 'were entirely motivated by narrow, selfish concerns'.

    “Yet, despite this their whole book is then based on the assumption that people behave as if they 'were entirely motivated by narrow, selfish concerns'.”
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    • cites Milgrom and Roberts (1992)

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 14

    The notion of reciprocity provides a natural interpretation of the evidence in Figure 2.

    “The notion of reciprocity provides a natural interpretation of the evidence in Figure 2.”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 12

    Employers have a strong interest in recruiting employees who have favourable preferences and whose preferences can be affected in favourable ways.

    “For this reason employers have a strong interest in recruiting employees who have favourable preferences and whose preferences can be affected in favourable ways.”
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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    Milgrom and Roberts (1992) acknowledge that important features of many organisations can best be understood in terms of deliberate attempts to change preferences of individual participants.

    “Milgrom and Roberts (1992) acknowledge this point when they write that 'important features of many organisations can best be understood in terms of deliberate attempts to change preferences of individual participants'.”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    The very fact that employees have so many opportunities to take advantage of their employer renders loyal workers very valuable for the employer.

    “The very fact that employees have so many opportunities to take advantage of their employer renders loyal workers very valuable for the employer.”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 12

    If it is true that some people are more self-interested than others, then choosing the 'right' people is one way of affecting the preferences of a firm's workforce.

    “If it is true that some people are more self-interested than others then choosing the 'right' people is one way of affecting the preferences of a firm's workforce.”
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    Premisecitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    Bewley reports that personnel managers use the possibility of firing workers mainly as a means to remove 'bad characters and incompetents' from the group and not as a threat to discipline the workers.

    “Bewley (1999), for example, reports that personnel managers use the possibility of firing workers mainly as a means to remove 'bad characters and incompetents' from the group and not as a threat to discipline the workers.”
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    • cites Bewley (1999)

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    Explicit threats create a hostile atmosphere and may even reduce the workers' general willingness to cooperate with the firm.

    “The reason is that explicit threats create a hostile atmosphere and may even reduce the workers' general willingness to cooperate with the firm.”
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    • cites Bewley (1999)

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.1 Reciprocity as a source of voluntary cooperation · p. 11

    The firing of lazy workers is mainly used to establish internal equity, and to prevent the unravelling of cooperation.

    “Therefore, the firing of lazy workers is mainly used to establish internal equity, and to prevent the unravelling of cooperation.”
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    • cites Bewley (1999)

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 19

    A marriage has to be based on mutual trust because otherwise it will not function well.

    “A marriage thus has to be based on mutual trust because otherwise it will not function well.”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 19

    Including contingencies about what will happen if one party fails to abide by the contract is likely to be taken as an indication of distrust and perhaps hostility, which may trigger a lack of mutual trust and cooperation.

    “Including contingencies about what will happen if one party fails to abide by the contract is likely to be taken as an indication of distrust and perhaps even hostility, which in turn may trigger what the prenuptial agreement attempted to avoid - a lack of mutual trust and cooperation.”
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    Interpretationnone given
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 19

    Being trusted is in itself valuable for the trustee.

    “Moreover, it also seems likely that being trusted is in itself valuable for the trustee.”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 15

    In the positive frame, the base wage is the natural reference point and the bonus focuses attention on the fact that something will be given if the desired effort is provided.

    “In the positive frame the base wage is the natural reference point and the bonus focuses attention on the fact that something will be given if the desired effort is provided.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the positive frame, the base wage is the natural reference point.

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 18

    Differences across treatments with and without incentives were qualitatively similar and quantitatively even larger in the CEO study than in the Fehr-Rockenbach study.

    “However, the differences across the treatments with and without incentives were qualitatively similar and quantitatively even larger than in the study by Fehr and Rockenbach.”
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    • cites Fehr and List 2002

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    Premiseown data
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 20

    In case of underprovision, workers expect to be punished in 54 percent of the cases and the expected average investment into punishment is 4 MUs.

    “It turns out that in case of underprovision workers expect to be punished in 54 percent of the cases and the expected average investment into punishment is 4 MUs.”
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    • cites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997

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    Premisereasoning
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 20

    The presence of a reward/punishment opportunity decreases shirking from 83 percent to 26 percent of trades, increases exact provision of ê from 14 to 36 percent, and increases overprovision from 3 to 38 percent of trades.

    “The presence of this opportunity decreases shirking from 83 percent to 26 percent of the trades, increases exact provision of ê from 14 to 36 percent and increases overprovision from 3 to 38 percent of the trades.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 20

    If workers exactly meet the desired effort, employers still reward in 41 percent of the cases and the average investment into rewarding is 4.5 MUs.

    “If workers exactly meet the desired effort employers still reward in 41 percent of the cases and the average investment into rewarding is 4.5 MUs.”
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    • cites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 20

    If there is underprovision of effort, employers punish in 68 percent of the cases and the average investment in punishment is 7 MUs.

    “If there is underprovision of effort employers punish in 68 percent of the cases and the average investment in punishment is 7 MUs.”
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    • cites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 20

    If there is overprovision, employers reward in 70 percent of these cases and the average investment in rewarding is also 7 MUs.

    “If there is overprovision employers reward in 70 percent of these cases and the average investment in rewarding is also 7 MUs.”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 19

    A marriage is always based on implicit agreements and voluntary cooperation because it is impossible to specify all aspects of a marriage in a comprehensive contract.

    “Since it is impossible to specify all aspects of a marriage in a comprehensive contract, a marriage is always based on implicit agreements and voluntary cooperation.”
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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 15

    In the negative frame, the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point and the fine focuses attention on the fact that something will be taken away in case of shirking.

    “In the negative frame the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point and the fine focuses attention on the fact that something will be taken away in case of shirking.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the negative frame, the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 19

    Although a substantial fraction of experimental subjects exhibits reciprocal behaviour, there is also a large fraction of subjects who behave in a purely selfish manner.

    “In section 2.1 we mentioned that, although a substantial fraction of experimental subjects exhibits reciprocal behaviour, there is also a large fraction of subjects who behave in a purely selfish manner.”
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    Premiseown data
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 20

    In case of overprovision, workers expect to receive a reward in 98 percent of the cases with an expected average investment of 6.5 MUs.

    “In case of overprovision they expect to receive a reward in 98 percent of the cases with an expected average investment of 6.5 MUs.”
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    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 20

    The average effort level is increased from e = 0.37 to e = 0.65 so that the gap between desired and actual effort levels almost vanishes.

    “The average effort level is increased from e = 0.37 to e = 0.65 so that the gap between desired and actual effort levels almost vanishes.”
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    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 21

    Holmström and Milgrom show that if the task where pay cannot explicitly be made contingent on performance is sufficiently important, it may even be better to provide no explicit incentives for any task.

    “Holmström and Milgrom show that if the task, where pay cannot explicitly be made contingent on performance, is sufficiently important it may even be better to provide no explicit incentives for any task.”
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    Premisecitation
    § 2.4 Reciprocity-based material incentives and implicit incentives through long-term interaction · p. 25

    The repeated interaction condition causes a huge increase in effort level because it causes the modal effort to shift to the maximal level.

    “Third, and most importantly for our present purposes, the repeated interaction condition causes a huge increase in the effort level because it causes the modal effort to shift to the maximal level.”
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    • cites Brown, Falk and Fehr 2001

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.4 Reciprocity-based material incentives and implicit incentives through long-term interaction · p. 27

    This has been shown theoretically (Kreps et al. 1982) and experimentally (Gächter and Falk, forthcoming).

    “This has been shown theoretically (Kreps et al. 1982) and experimentally (Gächter and Falk, forthcoming).”
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    • cites Gächter and Falk forthcoming

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    Interpretationnone given
    § 2.4 Reciprocity-based material incentives and implicit incentives through long-term interaction · p. 24

    The material incentives created through reciprocal responses are implicit because they are not based on contractual commitments.

    “The material incentives that are created through reciprocal responses are implicit because they are not based on contractual commitments.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.4 Reciprocity-based material incentives and implicit incentives through long-term interaction · p. 26

    In the absence of the opportunity to fire, maximal effort is achieved in less than 5 percent of cases while minimal effort still occurs in 16 percent of cases.

    “In particular, the maximal effort is achieved in less than 5 percent of the cases while the minimal effort level still occurs in 16 percent of the cases.”
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    • cites Gächter and Falk forthcoming

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 21

    This solution presupposes a high degree of voluntary cooperation so that employees are willing to perform in the absence of any incentives.

    “Yet, this solution presupposes a high degree of voluntary cooperation so that employees are willing to perform in the absence of any incentives.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 22

    The average bonus is strongly increasing in total effort and decreasing in effort differences across tasks.

    “It turns out that the average bonus is strongly increasing in total effort and decreasing in effort differences across tasks.”
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    • cites Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.4 Reciprocity-based material incentives and implicit incentives through long-term interaction · p. 25

    The majority of effort levels are above the minimal level, consistent with a substantial fraction of reciprocal workers.

    “Second, however, the majority of effort levels are above the minimal level, which is consistent with the existence of a substantial fraction of reciprocal workers.”
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    • cites Brown, Falk and Fehr 2001

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.4 Reciprocity-based material incentives and implicit incentives through long-term interaction · p. 27

    This disciplined the potential shirkers without offending the cooperators.

    “Our interpretation is that this disciplined the potential shirkers without offending the cooperators.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

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    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 23

    In the piece rate contract, average effort is always high in the rewarded task while in the non-rewarded task average effort converges to rather low levels.

    “In the piece rate contract the average effort is always high in the rewarded task while in the non-rewarded task average effort converges to rather low levels.”
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    • cites Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.4 Reciprocity-based material incentives and implicit incentives through long-term interaction · p. 27

    Reciprocity-based incentives based on the opportunity of punishing the agent ex-post discipline potential shirkers without offending those who cooperate voluntarily because there are no explicit threats.

    “We believe that reciprocity-based incentives based on the opportunity of punishing the agent ex-post exactly achieve this. These incentives discipline the potential shirkers because they know that a certain fraction of the principals is going to punish them in case of shirking without offending those who cooperate voluntarily because there are no explicit threats.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Most subjects consider shirking unfair if the contract offered the agent a generous share of the surplus.

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.1 The relevance of social approval · p. 28

    Social approval makes us proud and happy while disapproval causes embarrassment and shame and makes us unhappy.

    “Approval, therefore, makes us proud and happy while disapproval causes embarrassment and shame and makes us unhappy.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

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    Interpretationnone given
    § 3.1 The relevance of social approval · p. 29

    Most of us also value social approval positively (and disapproval negatively) for its own sake.

    “While social approval may be valued positively because it sometimes generates material benefits, we believe that most of us also value social approval positively (and disapproval negatively) for its own sake.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 22

    In the presence of only selfish subjects, the piece rate contract is more profitable and more efficient than the bonus contract although effort allocation across tasks will be inefficient in the piece rate contract.

    “Thus, in the presence of only selfish subjects the piece rate contract is more profitable and more efficient than the bonus contract although the effort allocation across tasks will be inefficient in the piece rate contract.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § 3.1 The relevance of social approval · p. 28

    Many people like to receive social approval and try to avoid social disapproval.

    “Circumstantial evidence and introspection suggests that many people like to receive social approval and try to avoid social disapproval.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 2.3 Reciprocity as a source of material incentives · p. 23

    In the bonus contracts, average effort is almost identical in both tasks and fluctuates around e1 = e2 = 6.

    “In contrast, in the bonus contracts the average effort is almost identical in both tasks and fluctuates around e 1 = e 2 = 6.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 35

    In the Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) experiment, promising children 1% of money collected reduced amount collected by 36%, and 10% reduced it by 8%.

    “When the children are promised that they can keep 1 percent of the money collected the amount collected is reduced by 36 percent and when they are promised that they can keep 10 percent of the money collected the reduction in the amount collected is still 8 percent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.3 The management of social norms · p. 37

    Social norms pervade the employment relationship; there are effort-enhancing and effort-decreasing norms.

    “Social norms also pervade the employment relationship. There are, in particular, effortenhancing norms and effort-decreasing norms.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Homans 1951

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Kandel and Lazear 1992

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Rehder 1990

      Not checked in the free run.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 35

    Paying people for moral behaviour reduces approval incentives because it makes the behaviour no longer considered moral.

    “Since moral behaviour typically is associated with social approval, paying for moral behaviour means that approval incentives will be reduced.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.1 The relevance of social approval · p. 29

    A plausible interpretation is that in the approval condition subjects feared the disapproval of the other group members.

    “A plausible interpretation of this is that in the approval condition subjects feared the disapproval of the other group members.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.1 The relevance of social approval · p. 29

    In the baseline condition of Rege and Telle's public goods experiment, subjects contributed 34 percent of their endowment to the public good while in the approval condition the contributions were twice as high.

    “In the baseline condition subjects contributed 34 percent of their endowment to the public good while in the approval condition the contributions were twice as high.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Rege and Telle 2001

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 33

    The introduction of the fine may be interpreted as a downward shift in reaction functions, causing breakdown of high-compliance equilibrium and shift to low-compliance equilibrium.

    “the introduction of the fine may be interpreted as a downward shift in individuals' reaction functions which caused the break down of the highcompliance equilibrium C and a gradual shift to the low-compliance equilibrium A'.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 30

    In public goods experiments, the opportunity to punish has a dramatic impact on cooperation: cooperation unravels to extremely low levels without punishment, while almost full cooperation can be established with punishment.

    “Fehr and Gächter (2000a) as well as Carpenter (2001) show that this opportunity to punish has a dramatic impact on cooperation. While cooperation unravels to extremely low levels in the absence of a punishment opportunity, almost full cooperation can be established in the presence of a punishment opportunity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Fehr and Gächter (2000a)

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Carpenter (2001)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 31

    Approval incentives are likely to cause strategic complementarity among agents' actions; the strength of approval incentives depends on other people's behaviour.

    “approval incentives are likely to cause strategic complementarity among the agents' actions, i.e., the strength of approval incentives depends on other people's behaviour.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3 The management of social norms · p. 36

    It may be unwise for a society to replace imprisonment by monetary fines to enforce important norms.

    “it may be unwise for a society to replace imprisonment by monetary fines to enforce important norms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 35

    Paying children money for volunteer activity removes the basis for social approval, reducing the approval reward.

    “Paying the children money for their activity removes, therefore, the basis for social approval. Or put differently: The monetary reward reduces the approval reward.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 33

    Demanding a price for being late decreased the disapproval costs for parents, so total costs of being late may have been reduced.

    “Demanding a price for being late decreased the disapproval costs for the parents so that the total costs of being late may have been reduced.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 3.3 The management of social norms · p. 36

    Social (dis)approval is a key element in the enforcement of social norms.

    “Social (dis)approval is a key element in the enforcement of social norms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3 The management of social norms · p. 36

    Rewarding people monetarily for obeying social norms may weaken norm enforcement and lead to gradual erosion of norm-guided behaviour.

    “rewarding people monetarily for obeying social norms may weaken norm enforcement and may, hence, lead to a gradual erosion of normguided behaviour.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 30

    Free-riding causes a lot of anger among cooperators, and this anger is anticipated by potential free-riders.

    “The emotions data in Gächter and Fehr (1999) suggest that free-riding causes a lot of anger among the cooperators and that this anger is anticipated by the potential free-riders.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gächter and Fehr (1999)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3 The management of social norms · p. 36

    Imprisonment and fining convey different moral messages: imprisonment conveys norm violation is morally wrongful, fining may transform norm violations into market transaction.

    “imprisonment and fining may convey very different moral messages. While imprisonment unambiguously conveys the message that the norm violator conducted morally wrongful acts, fining people may transform norm violations into a kind of market transaction.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 33

    In the kindergarten experiment, after the fine was introduced, the number of late parents increased steeply from week 7, reaching roughly twice the baseline, and remained roughly twice as high after the fine was removed.

    “from week 7 onwards, there is a steep increase in the number of late comers until their number is roughly twice as high as in the baseline condition. Moreover, when the fine is removed at the end of week 16 the number of tardy parents remains roughly twice as high as in the baseline condition.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.1 The crowding out of task-specific intrinsic motivation · p. 40

    The literature claims that introduction of monetary rewards decreases task-specific intrinsic motivation under identifiable conditions.

    “This literature claims that the introduction of monetary rewards decreases task-specific intrinsic motivation under identifiable conditions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Deci 1971 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Deci and Ryan 1985

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 45

    If Staw et al.'s result holds more generally, then crowding out of intrinsic task motivation is largely irrelevant for economic contexts because individuals expect some form of monetary compensation in economic interactions.

    “If this result holds more generally then the crowding out of intrinsic task motivation is largely irrelevant for economic contexts because, as a rule, individuals expect some form of monetary compensation in economic interactions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In economic contexts, individuals typically expect some form of monetary compensation, and monetary rewards are the norm.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 44

    Changes in time spent working on an interesting task can be interpreted in different ways, and not all ambiguities in this regard have been removed.

    “Some of our concerns have to do with the fact that the changes in the time spent on working on an interesting task can be interpreted in different ways, and to our knowledge not all of the ambiguities have been removed in this regard.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 45

    The evidence on crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not very informative about the impact of variations in payment scheme because there seem to be no studies examining that impact.

    “Unfortunately, the evidence on crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not very informative in this regard because there seem to be no studies that examine the impact of variations in the payment scheme on intrinsic motivation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 43

    In a survey of citizens of a small Swiss village, support for a repository for radioactive waste dropped from 51% to 25% when monetary compensation was offered.

    “In the survey the support of the voters dropped from 51% to 25% when monetary compensation was offered.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, Eichenberger (1996)

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 44

    By paying the boy for mowing the lawn, the father reveals a willingness to pay, which improves the boy's bargaining position.

    “Moreover, by paying the boy for mowing the lawn the father has revealed that he is willing to pay the boy for the activity, which improves the bargaining position of the boy.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.1 The crowding out of task-specific intrinsic motivation · p. 42

    In Deci (1971), treatment subjects spent 50 seconds less on puzzle solving in phase 3 compared to phase 1, while control subjects spent 28 seconds more.

    “While in the treatment condition the subjects spent 50 seconds less on puzzle solving in phase 3 compared to phase 1, in the control condition the subjects spent 28 seconds more in phase 3.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Deci 1971 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.3 The management of social norms · p. 39

    Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2001) show that the size of the externality affects the effort norm; increasing team bonus can increase effort norm; optimal bonus is higher with effort norm; sufficiently high bonus can induce coordination on Pareto-better equilibria.

    “Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2001) show that the size of the externality also affects the effort norm. In particular, by increasing the team bonus the principal can increase the effort norm. For this reason the optimal bonus is higher in the presence of an effort norm. Moreover, by choosing a sufficiently high bonus the principal can induce the agents to coordinate on Pareto-better equilibria.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2001)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 45

    Implicit incentives based on reciprocity or repeated interactions are frequently among the most relevant and most powerful incentives in economic contexts.

    “In fact, implicit incentives based on reciprocity or on repeated interactions are frequently among the most relevant and most powerful incentives in economic contexts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.1 The crowding out of task-specific intrinsic motivation · p. 42

    In Deci's experiment, self-report measure of intrinsic motivation was very similar across treatment conditions and phases, showing discrepancy with behavioural measure.

    “in both treatment conditions and in all phases the self-report measure of intrinsic motivation was very similar so that there was a discrepancy between the behavioural measure and the self-report measure of intrinsic motivation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Deci 1971 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 45

    The psychological literature does not address the efficiency question because neither the costs nor the full returns of subjects' performance are controlled in these experiments.

    “Unfortunately, the psychological literature does not address this question because neither the costs nor the full returns of the subjects' performance are controlled in these experiments.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.3 The management of social norms · p. 38

    By rendering effort a positive externality, a principal can generate effort-enhancing norms; if effort is a negative externality, effort-withholding norms are likely to arise.

    “by rendering effort a positive externality, a principal can generate effort-enhancing norms while if effort is a negative externality for other workers effortwithholding norms are likely to arise.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 44

    There are no convincing studies showing that the reduction in the behavioural measure of intrinsic motivation is not due to a signalling effect.

    “Likewise, we do not know of convincing studies showing that the reduction in the behavioural measure of intrinsic motivation is not due to a signalling effect.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 44

    The disappointment effect is potentially powerful because self-serving biases make people feel entitled to a previously paid reward, and if the reward is withdrawn, loss aversion and negative reciprocity come into play.

    “The disappointment effect is in our view a potentially quite powerful effect because the self-serving biases of the people quickly make them think that they are entitled to a previously paid reward and, if the reward is withdrawn loss aversion and negative reciprocity come to play a role.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Experience with children shows that they quickly feel entitled to rewards, even if given rarely, and become frustrated if they do not receive expected rewards.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 43

    For behavioural measures, the positive effect of verbal reinforcement holds only for college students and not for children; verbal reinforcement has no effect on the intrinsic motivation of children.

    “For the behavioural measures this is only true for college students but not for children. Verbal reinforcement has no effect on the intrinsic motivation of children.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS · p. 47

    Loss aversion affects inter-temporal labour supply behaviour.

    “There is, e.g., evidence suggesting that loss aversion affects inter-temporal labour supply behaviour (Camerer et al. 1997)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Camerer et al. 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 46

    There are still important ambiguities in the correct interpretation of the data, and it is not clear whether crowding out of task-specific intrinsic motivation prevails in contexts usually associated with monetary compensation.

    “There are, in our view, still some important ambiguities in the correct interpretation of the data and it is not clear whether crowding out of task-specific intrinsic motivation prevails in contexts usually associated with monetary compensation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS · p. 47

    There are powerful non-pecuniary motives that shape human behaviour.

    “While it is certainly true that the desires to avoid risk and to achieve income through effort are important it is equally true that there are powerful non-pecuniary motives that shape human behaviour.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4.2 How relevant is crowding out of intrinsic motivation for economics? · p. 46

    The effects discussed in sections 2 and 3 are not related to crowding out of intrinsic motivation because intrinsic motivation refers to task-specific phenomena, while reciprocity and social approval incentives refer to interpersonal relations.

    “Yet, the effects we have discussed in sections 2 and 3 are not related to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation: While intrinsic motivation refers to task-specific phenomena, reciprocity and social approval incentives refer to interpersonal relations.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS · p. 47

    Loss aversion lowers the effectiveness of tournament incentives, which in turn induces firms to compress wages.

    “Falk and Fehr (2001) have shown that loss aversion lowers the effectiveness of tournament incentives which, in turn, induces firms to compress wages.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Falk and Fehr (2001)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS · p. 48

    One can rarely import a psychological insight into economics without modification.

    “At the same time our experience tells us that one can rarely import a psychological insight into economics without modification.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
88 of 88

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Reciprocity is frequently quantitatively more important than other types of social preferences and has particularly important consequences in strategic interactions.

    “This does not mean that we believe that other types of social preferences like, e.g., altruism or spitefulness, are unimportant. It reflects, however, our belief that reciprocity is frequently quantitatively more important than other types of social preferences and that it has particularly important consequences in strategic interactions.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The kindness or hostility of an action depends on a reference point.

    “The notion of a kind or a hostile action inevitably depends on a reference point”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the negative frame, the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point.

    “In the negative frame the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the positive frame, the base wage is the natural reference point.

    “In the positive frame the base wage is the natural reference point”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Most subjects consider shirking unfair if the contract offered the agent a generous share of the surplus.

    “most subjects are likely to consider shirking as unfair if the contract offered the agent a generous share of the surplus”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In most employment relations, employees have to perform several tasks and it is often not possible to target explicit incentives to all tasks because of measurement and verifiability problems.

    “In most employment relations the employees typically have to perform several tasks and because of measurement and verifiability problems it is often not possible to target explicit incentives to all tasks.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Many contracts are deliberately left vague and incomplete, specifying important obligations in vague terms and not tying monetary payoffs to performance measures.

    “In reality many contracts frequently specify important obligations of the contracting parties in fairly vague terms, and they do not tie the parties' monetary payoffs to measures of performance that would be available at a relatively small cost.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People engage in many tasks and activities because they enjoy them.

    “There is no doubt that people engage in many tasks and activities because they enjoy them.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Many economic activities are intrinsically rewarding; people derive pleasure from the activity, and over some range pleasure increases with activity level.

    “many economic activities are, i.e., people directly derive pleasure from the activity and, over some range, the pleasure increases with increases in the activity level.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Parents picking up children late violates a legitimate rule and faces disapproval, which is a nonpecuniary cost.

    “if the parents pick up their children too late they violate a legitimate rule. As a consequence, the parents face the disapproval of the principal and of the employees of the Kindergarten, which can be thought of as the nonpecuniary cost for being late.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Individuals do not have perfect knowledge about the reasons for performing a task.

    “A crucial assumption of self-perception theory is that individuals do not have perfect knowledge about the reasons for performing a task.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    People have a psychological need for self-determination and competence.

    “Cognitive evaluation theory, on the other hand, assumes that people have a psychological need for self-determination and competence.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Individual i's level of compliance with a morally legitimate rule is higher the higher the average compliance of others.

    “In Figure 6 we assume for simplicity that individual i 's level of compliance with a morally legitimate rule (i.e., the relative frequency of obeying the rule in a given time interval) is the higher the higher the average compliance of the others.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In economic contexts, individuals typically expect some form of monetary compensation, and monetary rewards are the norm.

    “as a rule, individuals expect some form of monetary compensation in economic interactions.”
    “since in most cases some form of monetary reward prevails in economic contexts”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Experience with children shows that they quickly feel entitled to rewards, even if given rarely, and become frustrated if they do not receive expected rewards.

    “Experience with children shows that they quickly feel entitled to rewards, even if they are given them very rarely, and if they don't receive expected rewards they are frustrated.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are many social interactions for which monetary compensation is deemed inappropriate.

    “there are many social interactions for which monetary compensation is deemed inappropriate (e.g. in schools and families).”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    From an economic viewpoint, it is the total sum of incentive effects that matters.

    “from an economic viewpoint, it is the total sum of incentive effects that matters.”
17 of 17

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment.

    “Overall, punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment45–47.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [46]

    Section 3.2 (p. 30) reports that cooperation fell to very low levels without a punishment opportunity and was nearly complete when punishment was possible. That supports a link between punishment and cooperation, but it does not show that punishment overrides altruistic motives or that individuals free ride as soon as they can evade it. Section 2.4 (p. 27) instead describes some punishment opportunities as disciplining potential shirkers without offending voluntary cooperators. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Tirole citation year differs from reference list

    Minor

    The text cites Tirole (2002), but the only Tirole-authored item in the reference list is dated 2001.

  • Berry and Kanouse cited with conflicting publication years

    Minor

    The discussion cites Berry and Kanouse as a 1987 study, but the reference list dates the same authors' survey-payment study to 1897.

  • Masclet and coauthors cited with conflicting years

    Minor

    The discussion dates the Masclet and coauthors study to 2000, while the reference list dates it to 2001.

3 of 3

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

18 of the 94 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Akerlof, 1980, A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 37, 291
  2. Bewley, 1995, A depressed labor market as explained by participants, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 85, 250
  3. Camerer, 1997, Labor supply of New York city cab drivers: One day at a time, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 408
  4. Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., forthcoming. Why social preferences matter – the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation, and incentives, Economic Journal, in preparation.
  5. Frey, 1997, The cost of price incentives: An empirical analysis of motivation crowding out, American Economic Review, 87, 746
  6. Lindbeck, 1997, Incentives and social norms in household behavior, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 87, 370
  7. Moffit, 1983, An economic model of welfare stigma, The American Economic Review, 73, 1023
  8. Rabin, 1993, Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, American Economic Review, 83, 1281
  9. Rainwater, L., 1979. Stigma in income-tested programs. Paper Delivered at Conference on Universal vs. Income Tested Programs, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
  10. Segal, 1999, Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings, UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 99-10

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Fehr, E., & Falk, A.
Affiliations
University of Zurich (CH)
Corresponding author
Fehr, Ernst
ORCID
Venue
European Economic Review
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2002-05
Volume
46
Issue
4-5
Pages
687-724
ISSN
0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2
OpenAlex
W2551486737
Semantic Scholar
6d63c53094810d377841d540b836105c0b0f97b4
Cited by
1,240
References
94
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 67 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 53 · 2016: 60 · 2015: 68 · 2014: 69 · 2013: 70 · 2012: 88
FWCI
184.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • PsyDok Dokumentenserver für die Psychologie (Leibniz-Zentrum für Psychologische Information und Dokumentation) (submittedVersion)
  • Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Psychology Archives
  • ETH Zürich Research Collection
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
incentives, motives, reciprocity, social disapproval, financial incentives, backfire effect, compliance, contracts, organizations, behavioral economics

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-08.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-08.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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