I just lost it! Fear and anger reduce the sense of agency: a study using intentional binding
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Two recent studies have demonstrated that increases in arousal states lead to an increase people's sense of agency, i.e., the subjective experience of controlling one's own voluntary actions (Minohara et al. in Front Psychol 7:1165, 2016; Wen et al. in Conscious Cogn 36:87-95, 2015). We here extend these findings by showing that arousal states with negative emotional valence, such as fear and anger, decrease sense of agency. Anger and fear are negative emotional states. Anecdotally, they are often invoked as reasons for losing control, and neuroscientific evidence confirms important effects on the brain's action control systems. Surprisingly, the subjective experience of acting in anger or fear has scarcely been investigated experimentally. Thus, the legal notion that these intense emotions may undermine normal voluntary control over actions and outcomes (the 'Loss of Control', a partial defence for murder) lacks any clear evidence base. In three laboratory experiments, we measured sense of agency using an implicit measure based on time perception (the "intentional binding" paradigm). These actions occurred in either an emotionally neutral condition, or in a fearful (experiments 1 and 2) or angry state (experiment 3). In line with our hypotheses, fear or anger reduced the subjective sense of control over an action outcome, even though the objective causal link between action and outcome remained the same. This gap between the objective facts of agency, and a reduced subjective experience of agency under emotional conditions, has important implications for society and law.
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Cites
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Self-citationPhasic vs Sustained Fear in Rats and Humans: Role of the Extended Amygdala in Fear vs Anxiety
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Self-citationEmotion and the motivational brain
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The impact of anxiety upon cognition: perspectives from human threat of shock studies
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Cited by
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Bortolotti, L. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001 · Cited by 127
Feeling in Control: The Role of Cardiac Timing in the Sense of Agency
Herman, A. M., & Tsakiris, M. (2020) · Affective Science · doi:10.1007/s42761-020-00013-x · Cited by 37
Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020) · Culture, Mind, and Brain · doi:10.1017/9781108695374.010 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Christensen, J. F., Di Costa, S., Beck, B., & Haggard, P.
- Venue
- Experimental Brain Research
- Published
- 2019-03-02
- Volume
- 237
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1205-1212
- ISSN
- 0014-4819 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1106
- OpenAlex
- W2920352869
- Cited by
- 125
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 10.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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