The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A crash course in implementation theory
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Citations
Cites
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Gibbard, A. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914083 · Cited by 3,202
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation
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Subgame Perfect Implementation
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The informational size of message spaces
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Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information
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Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
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Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
Jackson, M. O., & Moulin, H. J. (1992) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(05)80044-4 · Cited by 92
Self-citationImplementation in Bayesian equilibrium: the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design
Palfrey, T. R. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol0521416663.008 · Cited by 89
Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
Tian, G. (1989) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297504 · Cited by 78
Nash Implementation of Matching Rules
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Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions
Hurwicz, L. (1994) · Review of Economic Design · doi:10.1007/bf02716611 · Cited by 74
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players
Harsanyi, J. C. (1982) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2527-9_7 · Cited by 65
Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
Glazer, J., & Rubinstein, A. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2385 · Cited by 61
Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time PreferencesPreprint
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Virtual Bayesian Implementation
Duggan, J. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171883 · Cited by 55
Walrasian social choice: some simple axiomatic approaches
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A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
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Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case
Serrano, R. (1993) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01240131 · Cited by 30
Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism
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Kalai, E., & Ledyard, J. O. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2459 · Cited by 23
Chakravorty, B., Corchón, L. C., & Wilkie, S. J. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.001 · Cited by 17
CREDIBILITY AND RENEGOTIATION OF OUTCOME FUNCTIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION
Sjöstrω, T. (1996) · Japanese Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00041.x · Cited by 7
Cited by
Roughgarden, T. (2010) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/1785414.1785439 · Cited by 288
Chen, Q., & Heydari, B. (2022) · Journal of Mechanical Design · doi:10.1115/1.4055057 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Jackson, M. O.
- Venue
- Social Choice and Welfare
- Published
- 2001-10-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 655-708
- ISSN
- 0176-1714 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-217X
- OpenAlex
- W1977483205
- Cited by
- 372
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 28.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.