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Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information
Abstract
READER'S GUIDE Part one of the chapter is written in an easy style, to try to demystify the subject (it is based on the lecture given at the World Congress). The Biblical story of the Judgement of Solomon is used as a running example for presenting different notions of implementation. Inevitably, perhaps, this part of the chapter contains a number of statements that are rather loose. This is compensated for by the more formal part two, which amplifies certain results and topics - though here, too, some degree of detail has been sacrificed for the sake of readability. The chapter deals with situations in which agents are presumed to have complete information about each other's preferences. Thomas Palfrey's chapter in this volume, “Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design,” is a companion to this, and looks at environments with incomplete information. Even though the complete-information environment is a restrictive case, the literature on it is vast and still growing. I have therefore had to be quite selective. The chapter should be seen as an overview of recent research, not as a comprehensive survey; I regret that I have not been able to do justice to the work of a number of authors.
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925895 · Cited by 7,458
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Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries
Besley, T. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.3.115 · Cited by 404
A crash course in implementation theory
Jackson, M. O. (2001) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s003550100152 · Cited by 372
Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2016) · Economica · doi:10.1111/ecca.12182 · Cited by 340
Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
Morgan, J. (2000) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00153 · Cited by 285
Metadata
- Authors
- Moore, J.
- Venue
- Advances in Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2008-12-02
- Pages
- 182-282
- OpenAlex
- W1592694813
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 38.81
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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