Predictions not commands: active inference in the motor system
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Abstract
The descending projections from motor cortex share many features with top-down or backward connections in visual cortex; for example, corticospinal projections originate in infragranular layers, are highly divergent and (along with descending cortico-cortical projections) target cells expressing NMDA receptors. This is somewhat paradoxical because backward modulatory characteristics would not be expected of driving motor command signals. We resolve this apparent paradox using a functional characterisation of the motor system based on Helmholtz's ideas about perception; namely, that perception is inference on the causes of visual sensations. We explain behaviour in terms of inference on the causes of proprioceptive sensations. This explanation appeals to active inference, in which higher cortical levels send descending proprioceptive predictions, rather than motor commands. This process mirrors perceptual inference in sensory cortex, where descending connections convey predictions, while ascending connections convey prediction errors. The anatomical substrate of this recurrent message passing is a hierarchical system consisting of functionally asymmetric driving (ascending) and modulatory (descending) connections: an arrangement that we show is almost exactly recapitulated in the motor system, in terms of its laminar, topographic and physiological characteristics. This perspective casts classical motor reflexes as minimising prediction errors and may provide a principled explanation for why motor cortex is agranular.
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![Fig. 2 Generation of spinal prediction errors and the classical reflex arc. This schematic provides examples of spinal cord circuitry that are consistent with its empirical features and could mediate proprioceptive predictions. They all distinguish between descending proprioceptive predictions of (Ia and Ib) primary afferents and predictions of the precision of the ensuing prediction error. Predictions of precision optimise the gain of prediction error by facilitating descending predictions (through NMDA receptor activation) and the afferents predicted (through gamma motor neuron drive to intrafusal muscle fibres). This necessarily entails alpha-gamma coactivation and renders descending predictions (of precision) facilitatory. The prediction errors per se are simply the difference between predictions and afferent input. The left panel considers this to be mediated by convergent monosynaptic (AMPA-R mediated) descending projections (‘CM’ neurons) and inhibition, mediated by the inhibitory interneurons of Ib (Rudomin and Schmidt 1999) or II (Bannatyne et al. 2006) afferents. The middle and right panels consider the actions of Ia afferents, which drive (or disinhibit) alpha motor neurons, in opposition to (inhibitory) descending predictions. The middle panel is based on Hultborn et al. (1987) and the right panel on Lindström (1973). Note that corticospinal neurons synapse directly with spinal motor neurons and indirectly via interneurons (Lemon 2008). When a reflex is elicited by stretching a tendon, sudden lengthening of the (fusimotor) muscle spindle stretch receptors sends proprioceptive signals (via primary sensory Ia neurons) to the dorsal root of the spinal cord. These sensory signals excite (disinhibit) alpha motor neurons, which contract (extrafusal) muscle fibres and return the stretch receptors to their original state. The activation of alpha motor neurons by sensory afferents can be monosynaptic or polysynaptic. In the case of monosynaptic (simple) reflex arcs (middle panel), a prediction error is generated by inhibition of the alpha motor neurons by descending predictions from upper motor neurons. In polysynaptic (spinal) reflexes, Ia inhibitory interneurons may report prediction errors (right panel). Ia inhibitory interneurons are inhibited by sensory afferents (via glycine) and this inhibition is countered by descending corticospinal efferents (Lindström 1973). In this polysynaptic case, reflex muscle fibre contractions are elicited by disinhibition of alpha motor neuron drive. Crucially, precisely the same muscle contractions can result from changes in descending (corticospinal) predictions. This could involve suspension of descending (glutamatergic) activation either of presynaptic inhibition of Ia afferents (Hultborn et al. 1987; reviewed by Rudomin and Schmidt 1999)—not shown—or of Ia inhibitory interneurons, and disinhibition of alpha motor neuron activity. The ensuing mismatch or prediction error is resolved by muscle contraction and a reduction in stretch receptor discharge rates. In both reflexes and voluntary movement, under active inference the motor system is enslaved to fulfil descending proprioceptive predictions. As Feldman (2009) notes, “posture-stabilizing mechanisms (i.e. classical reflex arcs) do not resist but assist the movement” [italics in original]: threshold control theory does this by changing the threshold position, active inference by changing proprioceptive predictions. The key aspect of this circuitry is that it places descending corticospinal efferents and primary afferents in opposition, through inhibitory interneurons. The role of inhibitory interneurons is often portrayed in terms of a reciprocal inhibitory control of agonist and antagonist muscles. However, in the setting of predictive coding, they play a simpler and more fundamental role in the formation of prediction errors. This role is remarkably consistent with computational architectures in the cortex and thalamus: for example, top-down projections in the sensory hierarchies activate inhibitory neurons in layer 1 which then suppress (superficial) pyramidal cells, thought to encode prediction error (Shlosberg et al. 2006). Note that there are many issues we have ignored in these schematics, such as the role of polysynaptic transformations, nonlinear dendritic integration, presynaptic inhibition by cutaneous afferents, neuromodulatory effects, the role of Renshaw cells, and other types of primary afferents](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/6fb459407fbd4312b8b815ab0f1022de/predictions-not-commands-active-inference-in-the-motor-system-figure-2.jpg)







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“All current analyses of canonical microcircuits place prediction error units in superficial layers [17–19].”
From Cerebral hierarchies: predictive processing, precision and the pulvinar (2015) · cites this paper as [18]
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“Indeed, under active inference, the descending proprioceptive predictions become motor commands that are fulfilled by peripheral reflexes in the spinal-cord and pontine nuclei (Adams et al., 2013a).”
From Virtual reality and consciousness inference in dreaming (2014) · cites this paper as Adams et al., 2013a
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“Action initiation involves ‘systematic misrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Adams et al. 2013
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“For example, a significant theory from AIF is that the human brain learns from the proprioceptive feedback it receives from muscles [1].”
From Reactive Environments for Active Inference Agents with RxEnvironments.jl (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
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“It is worth noting that in the Active Inference scheme, motor areas represent proprioceptive predictions and not motor commands (as traditionally assumed), in the same way as sensory (e.g., visual) areas represent exteroceptive predictions (Adams et al., 2013).”
From Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control (2015) · cites this paper as Adams et al., 2013
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Citations
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“These differences are known as prediction error, and the inversion scheme is generally called predictive coding (Rao and Ballard 1999).”
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“These attributes are indeed characteristic of cortical architectures (Friston 2005).”
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Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination
Todorov, E., & Jordan, M. I. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn963 · Cited by 3,081 · cited 1×
“This model was based on influential work by Todorov and Jordan (2002, 2004), who showed the selective use of sensory feedback to correct deviations that interfere with task goals could account for several unexplained effects in motor control, such as the variability of task-irrelevant movement…”
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“In these schemes, the inverse model has to generate a motor command from sensory cues— a complex transformation—and then a forward model uses an efference copy of this command to generate a predicted proprioceptive outcome called corollary discharge (Wolpert and Kawato 1998).”
MethodInfluentialHandbuch der physiologischen Optik
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Cited by
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816
Interoceptive predictions in the brain
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“…motor cortex (MC) as skeletomo-tor prediction signals, as well as to all primary sensory cortices as sensory prediction signals (see Figure 5C and D, respectively; for a discussion, see Bastos et al ., 2012; Adams et al. , 2013; Barbas, 2015; Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Chanes and Barrett, 2016).”
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“…motor cortex (MC) as skeletomotor prediction signals, as well as to all primary sensory cortices as sensory prediction signals (see Figure 5C and D, respectively; for a discussion, see Bastos et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013; Barbas, 2015; Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Chanes and Barrett, 2016).”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Adams, Rick A.
- Venue
- Brain Structure and Function
- Published
- 2012-11-06
- Volume
- 218
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 611-643
- ISSN
- 1863-2653 (ISSN-L)
- 1863-2661
- PMC
- PMC3637647
- OpenAlex
- W2033422410
- Semantic Scholar
- 241fc78745722ccc497ee91fe738ea6f69c031f9
- Cited by
- 765
- References
- 246
- Citations by year
- 2026: 63 · 2025: 63 · 2024: 66 · 2023: 75 · 2022: 59 · 2021: 82 · 2020: 90 · 2019: 57 · 2018: 45 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 42 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 28 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 2.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Brain Structure and Function (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (091593, 088130, 088130/Z/09/Z)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Keywords
- active inference, motor system, motor cortex, corticospinal projections, descending projections, top-down connections, prediction error, proprioception, Helmholtz, perceptual inference, NMDA receptor, hierarchical processing, motor reflexes, cortical laminar organization
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Brain Mapping, Cerebral Cortex, Humans, Models, Neurological, Motor Activity, Nerve Net, Neural Pathways, Neurons, Predictive Value of Tests, Reflex, Visual Perception
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