Predictions not commands: active inference in the motor system
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Abstract
The descending projections from motor cortex share many features with top-down or backward connections in visual cortex; for example, corticospinal projections originate in infragranular layers, are highly divergent and (along with descending cortico-cortical projections) target cells expressing NMDA receptors. This is somewhat paradoxical because backward modulatory characteristics would not be expected of driving motor command signals. We resolve this apparent paradox using a functional characterisation of the motor system based on Helmholtz's ideas about perception; namely, that perception is inference on the causes of visual sensations. We explain behaviour in terms of inference on the causes of proprioceptive sensations. This explanation appeals to active inference, in which higher cortical levels send descending proprioceptive predictions, rather than motor commands. This process mirrors perceptual inference in sensory cortex, where descending connections convey predictions, while ascending connections convey prediction errors. The anatomical substrate of this recurrent message passing is a hierarchical system consisting of functionally asymmetric driving (ascending) and modulatory (descending) connections: an arrangement that we show is almost exactly recapitulated in the motor system, in terms of its laminar, topographic and physiological characteristics. This perspective casts classical motor reflexes as minimising prediction errors and may provide a principled explanation for why motor cortex is agranular.
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![Fig. 2 Generation of spinal prediction errors and the classical reflex arc. This schematic provides examples of spinal cord circuitry that are consistent with its empirical features and could mediate proprioceptive predictions. They all distinguish between descending proprioceptive predictions of (Ia and Ib) primary afferents and predictions of the precision of the ensuing prediction error. Predictions of precision optimise the gain of prediction error by facilitating descending predictions (through NMDA receptor activation) and the afferents predicted (through gamma motor neuron drive to intrafusal muscle fibres). This necessarily entails alpha-gamma coactivation and renders descending predictions (of precision) facilitatory. The prediction errors per se are simply the difference between predictions and afferent input. The left panel considers this to be mediated by convergent monosynaptic (AMPA-R mediated) descending projections (‘CM’ neurons) and inhibition, mediated by the inhibitory interneurons of Ib (Rudomin and Schmidt 1999) or II (Bannatyne et al. 2006) afferents. The middle and right panels consider the actions of Ia afferents, which drive (or disinhibit) alpha motor neurons, in opposition to (inhibitory) descending predictions. The middle panel is based on Hultborn et al. (1987) and the right panel on Lindström (1973). Note that corticospinal neurons synapse directly with spinal motor neurons and indirectly via interneurons (Lemon 2008). When a reflex is elicited by stretching a tendon, sudden lengthening of the (fusimotor) muscle spindle stretch receptors sends proprioceptive signals (via primary sensory Ia neurons) to the dorsal root of the spinal cord. These sensory signals excite (disinhibit) alpha motor neurons, which contract (extrafusal) muscle fibres and return the stretch receptors to their original state. The activation of alpha motor neurons by sensory afferents can be monosynaptic or polysynaptic. In the case of monosynaptic (simple) reflex arcs (middle panel), a prediction error is generated by inhibition of the alpha motor neurons by descending predictions from upper motor neurons. In polysynaptic (spinal) reflexes, Ia inhibitory interneurons may report prediction errors (right panel). Ia inhibitory interneurons are inhibited by sensory afferents (via glycine) and this inhibition is countered by descending corticospinal efferents (Lindström 1973). In this polysynaptic case, reflex muscle fibre contractions are elicited by disinhibition of alpha motor neuron drive. Crucially, precisely the same muscle contractions can result from changes in descending (corticospinal) predictions. This could involve suspension of descending (glutamatergic) activation either of presynaptic inhibition of Ia afferents (Hultborn et al. 1987; reviewed by Rudomin and Schmidt 1999)—not shown—or of Ia inhibitory interneurons, and disinhibition of alpha motor neuron activity. The ensuing mismatch or prediction error is resolved by muscle contraction and a reduction in stretch receptor discharge rates. In both reflexes and voluntary movement, under active inference the motor system is enslaved to fulfil descending proprioceptive predictions. As Feldman (2009) notes, “posture-stabilizing mechanisms (i.e. classical reflex arcs) do not resist but assist the movement” [italics in original]: threshold control theory does this by changing the threshold position, active inference by changing proprioceptive predictions. The key aspect of this circuitry is that it places descending corticospinal efferents and primary afferents in opposition, through inhibitory interneurons. The role of inhibitory interneurons is often portrayed in terms of a reciprocal inhibitory control of agonist and antagonist muscles. However, in the setting of predictive coding, they play a simpler and more fundamental role in the formation of prediction errors. This role is remarkably consistent with computational architectures in the cortex and thalamus: for example, top-down projections in the sensory hierarchies activate inhibitory neurons in layer 1 which then suppress (superficial) pyramidal cells, thought to encode prediction error (Shlosberg et al. 2006). Note that there are many issues we have ignored in these schematics, such as the role of polysynaptic transformations, nonlinear dendritic integration, presynaptic inhibition by cutaneous afferents, neuromodulatory effects, the role of Renshaw cells, and other types of primary afferents](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/6fb459407fbd4312b8b815ab0f1022de/predictions-not-commands-active-inference-in-the-motor-system-figure-2.jpg)







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“All current analyses of canonical microcircuits place prediction error units in superficial layers [17–19].”
From Cerebral hierarchies: predictive processing, precision and the pulvinar (2015) · cites this paper as [18]
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“Indeed, under active inference, the descending proprioceptive predictions become motor commands that are fulfilled by peripheral reflexes in the spinal-cord and pontine nuclei (Adams et al., 2013a).”
From Virtual reality and consciousness inference in dreaming (2014) · cites this paper as Adams et al., 2013a
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“Action initiation involves ‘systematic misrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Adams et al. 2013
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“For example, a significant theory from AIF is that the human brain learns from the proprioceptive feedback it receives from muscles [1].”
From Reactive Environments for Active Inference Agents with RxEnvironments.jl (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
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“It is worth noting that in the Active Inference scheme, motor areas represent proprioceptive predictions and not motor commands (as traditionally assumed), in the same way as sensory (e.g., visual) areas represent exteroceptive predictions (Adams et al., 2013).”
From Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control (2015) · cites this paper as Adams et al., 2013
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“Switching from inference to forecasting and actions requires “ switching off ” sensory precision (sensory attenuation) (66 – 68); this abolishes belief updates, while PEs are now used as simulation or action signals (19,36,42).”
Computational psychiatry: from synapses to sentience
Friston, K. J. (2022) · Molecular Psychiatry · doi:10.1038/s41380-022-01743-z · Cited by 194
“Crucially, these accounts have attendant process theories that specify various forms of neuronal dynamics and message passing that can be evaluated empirically [54, 66, 70, 71, 73, 74, 176, 177].”
BackgroundSelf-citationA new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder
Jungilligens, J., Paredes-Echeverri, S., Popkirov, S., Barrett, L. F., & Perez, D. L. (2022) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awac204 · Cited by 164
Sensorimotor brain dynamics reflect architectural affordances
Djebbara, Z., Fich, L. B., Petrini, L., & Gramann, K. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1900648116 · Cited by 181
“(53), because this anatomical nature fits with the proposed hierarchical characteristics of forward and backward projections in active inferences.”
Corcoran, A. W., Pezzulo, G., & Hohwy, J. (2020) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09746-2 · Cited by 161
Computational Neuropsychology and Bayesian Inference
Parr, T., Rees, G., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2018.00061 · Cited by 149
“If abnormal priors relate to perceptual systems, the results may include sensory hallucinations (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013b) or anesthesia.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationThe role of interoceptive inference in theory of mind
Ondobaka, S., Kilner, J., & Friston, K. (2017) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2015.08.002 · Cited by 151
“This is exactly the same predictive coding scheme proposed for predictive processing of exteroceptive (Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999) and proprioceptive (Adams et al., 2013; Shipp et al., 2013) information and applied to mechanisms that underlie understanding of intentions in others (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 200…”
Self-citationLimanowski, J., & Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643 · Cited by 154
Self-citationThe rubber hand universe: On the impact of methodological differences in the rubber hand illusion
Riemer, M., Trojan, J., Beauchamp, M., & Fuchs, X. (2019) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.07.008 · Cited by 147
Mouse Motor Cortex Coordinates the Behavioral Response to Unpredicted Sensory Feedback
Heindorf, M., Arber, S., & Keller, G. B. (2018) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2018.07.046 · Cited by 153
“Combining this with the finding that motor cortex is necessary for turn initiation in response to an unexpected feedback perturbation but not for the execution of spontaneous turns per se, these data may point to a role of motor cortex in the response to unexpected sensory perturbations (Adams et al., 2013).”
Movement: How the Brain Communicates with the World
Schwartz, A. B. (2016) · Cell · doi:10.1016/j.cell.2016.02.038 · Cited by 132
“For instance, Friston (Adams et al., 2013), using arguments first put forth by Helmholtz, proposed an ‘‘active inference’’ scheme based on the idea that the brain, instead of representing ‘‘sensory images,’’ represents their causes.”
(2018) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 145
Self-citationPredictions drive neural representations of visual events ahead of incoming sensory information
Blom, T., Feuerriegel, D., Johnson, P. A., Bode, S., & Hogendoorn, H. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1917777117 · Cited by 148
The evolution of brain architectures for predictive coding and active inference
Pezzulo, G., Parr, T., & Friston, K. (2022) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0531 · Cited by 117
“For example, active inference emphasizes that some aspects (that roughly correspond to the notion of inverse models in optimal control) can be directly implemented by reflex arcs in the spinal cord [87].”
BackgroundSelf-citationDecoding hand gestures from primary somatosensory cortex using high-density ECoG
Branco, M. P., Freudenburg, Z. V., Aarnoutse, E. J., Bleichner, M. G., Vansteensel, M. J., & Ramsey, N. F. (2017) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.12.004 · Cited by 126
“…2012) the movement-related activation over the somatosensory cortex may relate, for example, to a predictive driving connection from S1 to M1 (Adams et al., 2012; Scott, 2012), or modulation by a top-down mechanism involved in motor preparation (Christensen et al., 2007) or even execution.”
InfluentialSafron, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2020.00030 · Cited by 133
“Some evidence for extending HPP to non-cortical systems includes decoding of predictive information from retinal cells (Palmer et al., 2015), and also models of motor control involving spinal reflex arcs as predictions (Adams et al., 2013).”
BackgroundPredictions, perception, and a sense of self
Picard, F., & Friston, K. (2014) · Neurology · doi:10.1212/wnl.0000000000000798 · Cited by 118
“The ensuing hierarchical control accommodates real-time adjustment/correction of the movement to nuance the fulfillment of descending proprioceptive predictions or corticospinal motor commands—or to update these commands.(15,16) Neurophysiologically, these updates may occur very quickly (each ;150 ms, i.”
BackgroundSelf-citationA social Bayesian brain: how social knowledge can shape visual perception
Otten, M., Seth, A. K., & Pinto, Y. (2017) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2016.05.002 · Cited by 124
Kuchling, F., Friston, K., Georgiev, G., & Levin, M. (2020) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2019.06.001 · Cited by 124
“This approach to neuronal dynamics has been successfully used to reproduce a variety of neuronal phenomena [Friston et al., 2017], [Ungerleider and Leslie, 2000], [Adams et al., 2013], [Desimone and Duncan, 1995], [Barrett and Simmons, 2015], [Corbetta and Shulman, 2002].”
MethodSelf-citationThe reorganization of corticomuscular coherence during a transition between sensorimotor states
Mehrkanoon, S., Breakspear, M. J., & Boonstra, T. W. (2014) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.06.050 · Cited by 124
“in trajectory planning to predict the sensory consequences of motor commands, which is updated through sensory prediction errors (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000; Shadmehr et al., 2010; Friston, 2010; Adams et al., 2013).”
BackgroundGenerative models, linguistic communication and active inference
Friston, K. J., Parr, T., Yufik, Y., Sajid, N., Price, C. J., & Holmes, E. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.07.005 · Cited by 108
“This sort of outcome is formally related to motor output under active inference; namely, the fulfilment of proprioceptive predictions by classical reflexes (Adams et al., 2013; Shipp et al., 2013).”
Self-citationA mathematical model of embodied consciousness.
Rudrauf, D., Bennequin, D., Granic, I., Landini, G., Friston, K., & Williford, K. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.05.032 · Cited by 118
“In active inference, motor commands become descending predictions of proprioceptive (or interoceptive) signals, which elicit motor (or autonomic) reflexes ( Adams et al., 2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Seth and Friston, 2016 ).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe functional logic of corticostriatal connections
Shipp, S. (2017) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-016-1250-9 · Cited by 118
“…central sulcus; S1 connects mainly with M1, the sensory association areas of rostral parietal cortex with caudal premotor cortex, and more caudal visuosensory areas with rostral premotor cortex (Darian-Smith et al. 1993; Matelli et al. 1998; Shipp et al. 1998; Geyer et al. 2000; Adams et al. 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationA World Unto Itself: Human Communication as Active Inference
Vasil, J., Badcock, P. B., Constant, A., Friston, K., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00417 · Cited by 94
“Precise (attended, ascending) error signals then serve to modulate action and direct what is learned (Adams et al., 2013; Feldman & Friston, 2010).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDeep active inference as variational policy gradients
Millidge, B. (2020) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102348 · Cited by 115
Brown, M., & Kuperberg, G. R. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00643 · Cited by 109
“One hypothesis, however, is that the impairment stems from a general tendency of patients to underestimate the precision of their prior predictions (see Adams et al., 2013b).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialFriston, K. J., Sajid, N., Quiroga-Martinez, D. R., Parr, T., Price, C. J., & Holmes, E. (2021) · Hearing Research · doi:10.1016/j.heares.2020.107998 · Cited by 93
Self-citationRethinking post-traumatic stress disorder – A predictive processing perspective
Κube, T., Berg, M., Kleim, B., & Herzog, P. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.04.014 · Cited by 114
Embodiment and Schizophrenia: A Review of Implications and Applications
Tschacher, W., Giersch, A., & Friston, K. (2017) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbw220 · Cited by 102
Self-citationActive inference as a theory of sentient behavior
Pezzulo, G., Parr, T., & Friston, K. (2024) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2023.108741 · Cited by 109
“One example is the development of theories of interoceptive inference and autonomic control (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Pezzulo, 2014; Seth et al., 2012) by analogy with the functioning of action control (Adams et al., 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationInteroception as modeling, allostasis as control
Sennesh, E., Theriault, J., Brooks, D., van de Meent, J.-W., Barrett, L. F., & Quigley, K. S. (2022) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108242 · Cited by 107
Tschantz, A., Barca, L., Maisto, D., Buckley, C. L., Seth, A. K., & Pezzulo, G. (2022) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2022.108266 · Cited by 118
Predictive Coding: a Theoretical and Experimental Review
Millidge, B., Seth, A., & Buckley, C. L. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2107.12979 · Cited by 106
Linson, A., Clark, A., Ramamoorthy, S., & Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2018.00021 · Cited by 90
“Working backwards in a sense, to facilitate this transition, a series of actions “fall out,” unfolding without requiring the planning of a sequence of action commands (Adams et al., 2013), in stark contrast to the robotics paradigm of sense-plan-act.”
ResultSelf-citationSensorimotor beta power reflects the precision-weighting afforded to sensory prediction errors
Palmer, C. E., Auksztulewicz, R., Ondobaka, S., & Kilner, J. M. (2019) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.06.034 · Cited by 104
Siman-Tov, T., Granot, R., Shany, O., Singer, N., Hendler, T., & Gordon, C. R. (2019) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.08.012 · Cited by 106
Palmer, C. J., Seth, A. K., & Hohwy, J. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.007 · Cited by 101
“Thus, movement is cast as a process by which initially inaccurate predictions regarding the parameters of proprioceptive feedback (mediated by descending cortical projections) are fulfilled by spinal reflexes that modulate muscle activity to bring proprioceptive states into line with these predictions (Adams et al., 2…”
BackgroundBastos-Leite, A. J., Ridgway, G. R., Silveira, C., Norton, A., Reis, S., & Friston, K. J. (2015) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbu080 · Cited by 99
Self-citationCognitive Dynamics: From Attractors to Active Inference
Friston, K., Sengupta, B., & Auletta, G. (2014) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2014.2306251 · Cited by 98
“the same sorts of questions apply to perception [70], [71]: for example, are visually evoked neuronal responses caused by external events or by our movements? We will return to this question in Section VI.”
BackgroundSelf-citationWorld model learning and inference
Friston, K., Moran, R. J., Nagai, Y., Taniguchi, T., Gomi, H., & Tenenbaum, J. (2021) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2021.09.011 · Cited by 90
“…words, actions serve the use of information from the real world, whereby models of human behaviour and action only serve to minimise free energy (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013): by both adjusting parameters of the world model, and by choice of a set of actions that it believes will be…”
BackgroundSelf-citationTarhan, L., Watson, C. E., & Buxbaum, L. J. (2015) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00876 · Cited by 102
Evidence for surprise minimization over value maximization in choice behavior
Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T. H. B., Mathys, C., Dolan, R., Kronbichler, M., & Friston, K. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep16575 · Cited by 96
Self-citationMind-Body Interactions in Anxiety and Somatic Symptoms
Mallorquí-Bagué, N., Bulbena, A., Pailhez, G., Garfinkel, S. N., & Critchley, H. D. (2016) · Harvard Review of Psychiatry · doi:10.1097/hrp.0000000000000085 · Cited by 96
Re-thinking the role of motor cortex: Context-sensitive motor outputs?
Gandolla, M., Ferrante, S., Molteni, F., Guanziroli, E., Frattini, T., Martegani, A., Ferrigno, G., Friston, K. J., Pedrocchi, A., & Ward, N. (2014) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.01.011 · Cited by 99
“Although there are commonalities between the two accounts, the key difference is that under optimal control, given a same task and a same state of the system, motor signals are contextindependent commands, whereas under active inference they are context-dependent predictions (Adams et al., 2012).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Adams, Rick A.
- Venue
- Brain Structure and Function
- Published
- 2012-11-06
- Volume
- 218
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 611-643
- ISSN
- 1863-2653 (ISSN-L)
- 1863-2661
- PMC
- PMC3637647
- OpenAlex
- W2033422410
- Semantic Scholar
- 241fc78745722ccc497ee91fe738ea6f69c031f9
- Cited by
- 765
- References
- 246
- Citations by year
- 2026: 63 · 2025: 63 · 2024: 66 · 2023: 75 · 2022: 59 · 2021: 82 · 2020: 90 · 2019: 57 · 2018: 45 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 42 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 28 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 2.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Brain Structure and Function (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (091593, 088130, 088130/Z/09/Z)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Keywords
- active inference, motor system, motor cortex, corticospinal projections, descending projections, top-down connections, prediction error, proprioception, Helmholtz, perceptual inference, NMDA receptor, hierarchical processing, motor reflexes, cortical laminar organization
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Brain Mapping, Cerebral Cortex, Humans, Models, Neurological, Motor Activity, Nerve Net, Neural Pathways, Neurons, Predictive Value of Tests, Reflex, Visual Perception
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